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ABSTRACT
The growth acceleration episodes characterizing Botswana and Equatorial Guinea were
based on the respective discoveries of diamonds and oil. However, while Botswana, already
characterized by inclusive and democratic institutions, succeeded in transferring much of the
benefits deriving from the natural resource to society, Equatorial Guinea's corrupt
government retained all the oil-generated wealth and prevented the population's standard of
living from improving at a pace proportional to the country's growth. The two countries also
differ in terms of their vulnerability to the "resource curse" phenomenon, due to their
unequal level of economic diversification both within the major natural resource sector and
across several industries.
This Thesis firstly adopts a deep analytical approach to compare the two countries'
development records and to understand the discrepancy in the quali of the two growth
acceleration episodes. The second main contribution of this study consists in the analysis of
the potential benefits resulting from the implementation of Public-Private Partnerships in
the developing world. The methodology applied in the last section derives from Game
Theory, a branch of Economics increasingly adopted in applications to real-world
circumstances. In this specific case, the results of this coordination exercise between public
and private parties will present very different implications for a democratic country as
Botswana and for a corrupt one as Equatorial Guinea.
Thesis Supervisor: Simon Johnson
Tide: Ronald A. Kurtz (1954) Professo of Entrepreneurship
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0. Introduction
De Beers' main marketing statement is "Diamonds are forever". In line with a quite
different interpretation, Fabrizio De Andre, a highly celebrated Italian singer of the 70's,
wrote in his song Via del Campo: "Dai diamanti non nasce niente, dal letame nascono i fior,"
meaning "Nothing grows of precious diamonds, out of dung flowers do grow." None of
these statements are fully true, but De Andre's one is certainly more realistic.
First of all, diamonds are clearly not forever, and any country's resource endowment is
sooner or later doomed to complete depletion. As a result, all resource-rich countries are
potentially vulnerable to the realization of the "resource curse," thus developing an excessive
dependence on the resource to spur and sustain growth.
The Italian singer is certainly too categoric in his affirmation. Truly, diamonds as a
natural resource are neither necessary nor sufficient to set a country on a positive
development path; nonetheless, they could facilitate the attainment of this goal by providing
significant fiscal resources that, if allocated efficiently and productively, could boost growth
and even prevent the "resource curse" from materializing. The "allocative condition" is,
however, very difficult to implement in developing countries characterized by a lack of
democracy and a corrupt administrative and political spheres.
This Thesis, by first comparing Botswana's and Equatorial Guinea's development
records, will shed light on how gaps in institutional quality can be reflected in significant
discrepancies concerning resource utilization and vulnerability to the "resource curse".
First of all, Chapter 1 will compare the two countries in terms of their history and
colonial past, providing an initial description of the institutions characterizing their societal
forms before the XX* century discoveries of natural resources. Chapter 2 will introduce the
concept of "resource curse" and explain to what extent both countries might be vulnerable
to the realization of this phenomenon. In Chapter 3, a first section will define the concept of
"growth acceleration" according to the main trends in the economic literature; two other
sections will examine the growth acceleration episodes in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea,
defining both countries' developmental track according to a relevant set of measures and
statistics. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 will adopt an endogenous institutional
perspective also in consideration of both countries' involvement in regional and international
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agreements. In Chapter 5 I will study the effects of the natural resource-driven increase in
foreign investment in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea from the BB-NN model's angle.
Chapter 6 will firstly introduce the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and related
best practices; the second section of this chapter will be entirely dedicated to a Game
Theoretic analysis of a PPP. The concluding remarks about this analytical journey will be
presented in Chapter 7.
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1. Does the colonial past matter? Two "Histories" in comparison
1.1 Botswana: a reiterated institutional success
To introduce this section dedicated to a retrospective analysis of Botswana's success
with an extract from Landell-Mills (1992) is particularly appropriate: "Botswana is the only
African country that has managed to transform its colonial heritage into a viable democracy
without first passing through a period of authoritarian rule, mainly as a result of the wise
political leadership and a large measure of good fortune."'
Botswana is a landlocked country, sharing borders with Namibia, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe. Characterized by a semi-arid climate causing periodic droughts, it is slightly
smaller than Texas2 in size and the 84% of its territory is covered by the Kalahari Desert.
For this reason, the majority of the population inhabits the eastern part of the country,
where the majority of the country's arable land is located.
The etymology of the word "Botswana" derives from Tswana, the name of the tribe
inhabiting the country's territory. Despite the centralized nature of the Tswana State, a
democratic representation was consistently assured to the leaders of different communities.
The chief, the kgosi, was considered as the absolute authority in the country, second only to
his predecessors and to the God Modimo'. The Tswana chief's authority over the community
was ensured by three main powers he held in full: the political, the magical (i.e. the tribal
meaning of "religious"), and the economic one. Leaders of different Tswana states were
considered as advisors to the kgosi; their roles were formalized in (1) the dikala tsa kgosi, the
body including the most confidential advisors to the kgosi who were not chosen on the basis
of their social status and in (2) the councils of Bagolwane specifically representing the interests
of the Tswana headmen. The Tswana assemblies, the dikgotla, were fairly centralized by
allowing participation to a very small circle of individuals; if the dikgotla were similar to
1 LANDELL-MILLS, P., 1992. Governance, Cultural Change, and Empowerment. The Journal of Modern African
Studies, 30(4), p. 544.
2 Central Intelligence Agency (2013) The World Factbook: Botswana. [online] Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.htnl
3 ACEMOGLU, D., JOHNSON, S., and ROBINSON, J., 2002. An African Success Story: Botswana, p. 9. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 3219. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=304100
4 Being the God a living man, the chief was the only person allowed to approach him, a privilege not even
granted to the priests.
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modern Regional Councils, we could assimilate the kgotla (composed of a restricted group of
adult males) to the National Assembly.
Botswana's land was a public resource, while cattle, the second most important form
of economic wealth, were private and their distribution was managed by the chief according
to an individual's social status. In line with an evil connotation of any political conflict, the
Tswana society committed to a fully peaceful resolution of any confrontation emerging in
the state; lacking a permanent army, they assembled an ad hoc one in the case of impending
need. Accordingly, conflicts were extremely rare if nonexistent also amongst the multiple
ethnic groups sharing the territory of current Botswana. Despite the fact that nearly 85% of
the population currently speaks the official language Setsnana5 , ethnic diversity still
fundamentally defines the country's society. The Tswana tribe has always fostered the
integration of other groups in their institutional apparatus in exchange for the payment of a
tribute; thus, homogeneity and "inclusive pluralism" developed internally to then become
cardinal elements of modern Botswana.
In the year 1885, with the aim of preventing the German colonial expansion from
the recently annexed South West Africa (i.e. modern Namibia), the British established the
Bechuanaland Protectorate in current Botswana. As a crucial point explaining a major part of
Botswana's future democratic development, the British colonial power preserved all
institutions created by the Tswana tribe over so many years. In contrast with other colonial
experiences as the one of the Belgian King Leopold II in Congo, Botswana's one was not
disruptive of the Tswana status quo while allowing the institutional structure to naturally
evolve over time. This colonial commitment to foster the internal development of an
optimal institutional apparatus is confirmed by the fact that around 75% of all colonial
expenditures was directed at supporting the Tswana administration. Even when the 1910
Act of Union combined the three British protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutholand (i.e.
modern Lesotho) and Swaziland under the same name of "South Africa," Botswana was still
allowed to maintain its cultural and institutional specificities.
5 ACEMOGLU, D., JOHNSON, S., and ROBINSON, J., 2002. An African Success Story: Botswana, p. 11. CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 3219. Available at SSRN: http://ssrm.com/abstract=304100
6 ALFARO, L., ALLIBHOY, F., and SPAR, D., 2005. Botswana- A Diamond in the Rough. Harvard Business
School Paper No. 9-703-027, p.3 .
9
In the post-World World I period, Botswana was led by the Tswana chief Tsekedi Khama
and the local advisory councils were still very active in supporting the leader's decisions. At
the same time, Botswana's major neighbor, South Africa, was subject to the spread of
undemocratic and racist political ideologies; the pro-apartheid National Party had already
gathered a solid consent among the country's major political constituencies. The apartheid
system's development had negative repercussions on Botswana; due to the South Africa's
opposition to mixed marriage, Seretse Khama, the natural successor of his uncle Tsekedi,
was prevented from entering Botswana with his white wife met while studying Law at
Oxford. Nonetheless, the negative occurrence had very positive implications: this forced
exile generated probably the most charismatic and engaged leader that Botswana has had
until now. Once Seretse came back to his country, he initiated a comprehensive process of
political and institutional reforms that shaped modern Botswana. The instauration of a
legislative council, readily allowed by the British, occurred in 1958; it represented the first
step in the creation of a national Constitution. The Bechuanaland People's Party,
disturbingly sympathetic to the pro-apartheid National Party in South Africa, was contrasted
by Khama's creation of the Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) in 1961. The institutional
apparatus was then reformed to include the creation of a formally elected national assembly
of thirty-six members (four of whom were elected by the President), a house of chiefs
representing the different local interests and elected according to traditional precepts, and a
President. After the implementation of this political plan and the creation of the
Constitution of Botswana, the first democratic elections held in 1965 saw Khama's party, the
BDP, at the top of people's preferences. Independence from British rule was obtained 1966,
when Botswana formally gained the status of a sovereign republic. The BDP consistently
maintained its majority over the years; Seretse Khama's death in 1980 was followed by the
presidencies of Ketumile Masire (1980-1998) and Festus Mogae (1999-2008), before Ian
Khama, first-born son of Seretse, took office in 2009.
This brief historical digression on Botswana proves that the country's institutional
and democratic excellence shaped State development from a system of interconnected tribes
tied by a common loyalty to the Tswana State, to the Bechuanaland British Protectorate that
fostered the emergence of an inclusive system, to the current Republic of Botswana, a wholly
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sovereign state that made an institutional leap back in the 1960's by formalizing the
foundations of its democratically elected government through the creation of a Constitution.
1.2 Equatorial Guinea: the paradigm of stable corruption
Equatorial Guinea's colonial history, much differently from Botswana's, did not
create the bases for a positive institutional development. Even before the instauration of a
British colony, Botswana presented somewhat democratic institutions; differently, Equatorial
Guinea's political and institutional apparatus was always defined by corruption and
dictatorship.
Constituted by the insular part Bioko (and several other tiny volcanic islands as
Annobon, Corisco, Elobey Chico, Elobey Grande, and Mbane) situated in the Gulf of
Guinea and hosting the capital Malabo, and by a mainland part Rio Muni, Equatorial
Guinea's total area is slightly smaller than Maryland7 and is characterized by a tropical
climate and by a 5% of arable land; also called the "Amazon of Africa," the country is rich in
lush rainforests and presents an incredible biodiversity. The people of Equatorial Guinea
represent a plurality of ethnic backgrounds and are composed of the Anabonese, Bubi,
Bujeba, Fang, Fernandino, and Ndowe tribes.
Initially inhabited by the Pygmies and main destination of Bantu groups' migrations
in the 17* and 19* century, the island of Bioko was originally discovered in 1471 by the
Portuguese explorer Fernando Poo, who first called it "Formosa" (i.e. pretty flower) before
renaming it after himself. The island formally became a Portuguese colony in 1474. After
three centuries of inefficient and unproductive colonization, the Treaty of Pardo of 1778
legitimized the Portuguese "trade" of this African colony with Spain in exchange for South
American land. From 1827 to 1843 a British base was established on the Bioko islands with
the purpose of terminating the slave trade. A Spanish protectorate on the Rio Muni
mainland was then instituted in 1885, and the Treaty of Paris of 1900 formalized Spanish
colonial control on the region. In terms of fostering the country's economic and institutional
development, Spain performed marginally better than Portugal as a colonizer. Through
heavy investments in the development of cacao plantations, it boosted a substantial
7 Central Intelligence Agency (2013) The World Factbook: Equatorial Guinea. [online] Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ek.html
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immigration of workers from Nigeria. In spite of the initial spread of malaria, the period of
Spanish colonialism was characterized by a relatively high rate of literacy and health care.
In the first half of the XX century the insular and mainland regions were unified
and they took the name of Equatorial Guinea in 1963. In the same year the promulgation of
the Basic Law granted the two provinces some sort of limited autonomy under the purview
of a joint legislative body. Pressures exercised by Equatoguinean nationalists and UN
representatives favored the attainment of Equatorial Guinea's independence in 1968. This
year also marked the beginning of President Francisco Macias Nguema Biyogo's despotic,
unacceptably violent, and authoritarian regime. Freedom of expression was banned and
political opponents were jailed and executed; opposition parties were declared illegal in 1969
and in 1972 President Macias appointed himself as President for life. Apart from the
incredibly ruinous impact on the country's already weak infrastructures, human right
violations became so evident that Equatorial Guinea started gaining reputation as the
"Auschwitz of Africa"; the Nigerian workers, previously attracted by job prospects in cocoa
plantations, left the country en masse during Macias's presidency.
President Macias's unconcealed and brutal dictatorship was replaced by one that is
internationally viewed as more subtle and moderate; this "new regime" is controlled by
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President Macias's nephew and former director of the
notorious Black Beach prison, who launched a coup d'6tat in 1979. The year 1982 saw the
beginning of Nguema's Presidency as well as the promulgation of a new Constitution that,
even though created under the auspices of the UN Commission on Human Rights, still
lacked any democratic nuance; most of the powers were still held by the President.
In 1987 the President gave birth to the Partido Democratico de Guinea Ecuatorial (i.e.
Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea), which kept its majority and undisputed control
until now. Despite some institutional rearrangements, as the end of a one-party rule in 1991,
the President and a small group of advisors managed to dominate the country's politics and
destiny. In spite of the 1992 formation of thirteen parties, Equatorial Guinea still presented a
strong democratic deficit and lacked a proper system of institutional checks and balances; even
if formally legitimized, the opposition has never practically had a role in Equatoguinean
politics. For instance, the 100-members Chamber of Representatives, directly elected for a
five-year term, always acts under the direction of the President. In line with the same
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undemocratic logic, the 100-members National Assembly created in 2004, includes 14
"loyal" opponents and 2 "real" ones.
A tentative coup, which allegedly involved also Margaret Thatcher's son Sir Mark
Thatcher, was organized and spotted in 2004. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit
forecasts, Mr Obiang Nguema' autocratic regime is subject to significant risks to be diverted
by a coup in the period 2013-2017. Despite all accusations of corruption and money
laundering addressed to his son by the French and American government, President Obiang
Nguema supported Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue's promotion to the rank of Vice-
President in 2012. If his father is not replaced by a coup, Teodorin will be the main
candidate as the new President of Equatorial Guinea, thereby perpetuating this profoundly ill
and inefficient system.
This historical excursus on Equatorial Guinea has shed light on the sharp differences
existing between the country's exclusive and autocratic institutions and the democratic rule
of law characterizing Botswana's regime. Clearly, this significant institutional discrepancy
does not result from the different identities of their respective colonizers, since both Spain
and Britain have had positive and negative colonial experiences. However, it is undisputable
that the management of the extractive sector and the resource curse problem are strongly
dependent on the level of democracy and institutional inclusiveness characterizing the
country. A more comprehensive view on this topic will be offered in Chapter 2.
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2. The Resource Curse explained in Botswana and Equatorial
Guinea
2.1 An assorted definition of the Paradox of Plenty
The economic literature on the resource curse phenomenon is extensive. In this first
paragraph I will introduce the main elements of the economic reasoning underlying the
Resource Curse, also called the Paradox of Plenty.
Sachs and Warner (2001) define the curse of natural resources as "the observation
that countries rich in natural resources tend to perform badly,"' arguing that the weak
development record characterizing resource-rich countries is supported by strong
econometric evidence, even after controlling for trends in commodity prices. In particular,
they articulate the resource curse paradigm according to the following formulation: the
presence of natural resources in a country crowds out the so-called actitig x which is the
main driver of growth. As a result, natural resources actually hinder the realization of
growth. There are of course different theories presenting different interpretations for what
this acitity x might be. In the opinion of Sachs and Warner (2001) the identity of actii x
can be found in traded manufacturing activities. The dynamics are represented as follows:
the natural resource boom has a positive impact on the country's wealth, thereby increasing
the demand and price of non-traded goods; non-traded input costs and wages follow the
same increasing tendency. A drop in profitability is therefore forced on those traded goods
sector (e.g. manufacturing) that adopts the now more expensive non-traded inputs in their
production process, while selling their output at fairly fixed international prices. The bottom
line is that this negative impact produced on the manufacturing sector, certainly not
sustainable from the long-term developmental perspective, will eventually stop the positive
growth spiral that initially benefited the country. Sachs and Warner (2001) also present the
following measure of the imbalance between the non-traded goods and traded goods sectors:
the ratio of non-traded products (supposedly higher in resource-abundant countries) to
traded products (supposedly constant in resource-abundant countries with respect to
international standards). This ratio, presumably higher in resource rich countries, presents at
the numerator the product of GDP in US dollars at current prices and the nominal US dollar
8 SACHS, J.D. and WARNER, A.M., 2001. The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4-6), p.
827.
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exchange rate (i.e. Y*P/E), and at the denominator the GDP computed according to the
international price level (i.e. Y*P$). The Dutch Disease is exactly defined as the natural
resource boom's negative impact on the manufacturing sector, realized through a real
appreciation of the country's exchange rate that makes that country's economy less
competitive vis-a-vis the international market. According to the authors' econometric
analysis, resource rich countries indeed present a price level that is greater than the
international standard. Their hypothesis concerning the discrepancy between the non-traded
and traded sectors finds its econometric evidence in the fact that in resource-rich countries,
the manufacturing sector contributes significantly less than the natural resources one to
exports in terms of value added.
Other authors present different interpretations of the activit x that is crowded out by
a country's natural resource endowment. For instance, Gylfason et al. (1999) and Gylfason
(2000) argue that x corresponds to Education, while Auty (2000) sets x to be equal to the
political process that is completely distorted by a predatory form of governance. On the
same line of reasoning, we could consider the activig x to represent the level of
entrepreneurial activity or innovation, assuming that profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will be
attracted by the wage premium characterizing the natural resource sector. Another
alternative for the identity of x would be the level of institutional inclusiveness in a country;
a low record on this parameter would produce rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and
inefficient allocation of wealth that, via the negative impact on governance, will deplete the
growth accumulated by the country.
Singer (1950) explains the resource curse phenomenon through a deterioration of the
terms of trade in the resource-abundant country, for whom imports of manufactured goods
are more expensive than the natural resource it supplies on international markets. In the
economist's own words: "Good prices for their primary commodities.. .give to the
underdeveloped countries the necessary means for importing capital goods and financing
their own industrial development; yet at the same time they take away the incentive to do so,
and investment, both foreign and domestic, is directed into an expansion of primary
commodity production, thus leaving no room for the domestic investment which is the
required complement of any import of capital goods. Conversely, when the prices and sales
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of primary commodities fall off, the desire for industrialization is suddenly sharpened. Yet, at
the same time, the means for carrying it out are sharply reduced."9 These resource-abundant
countries seem therefore captured in an industrialiZation trap, which could be avoided as a
result of an increase in foreign investment to be efficiently allocated to productive projects in
the view of a sustainable development. This precept provides the perfect link to an
alternative explanation of the resource curse, which is, in my opinion, the main determinant
of the development gap between Botswana and Equatorial Guinea: the presence of inclusive
institutions preventing the government's excessive rent-seeking and corrupt attitude, and
instead fostering an efficient allocation of national resources to a productive use and putting
the country on a sustainable path of growth.
Melhum at al. (2006) treat the topic of the resource curse by dedicating a particular
attention to the analysis of institutions. According to their research, there exists significant
econometric evidence denying the presence of a resource curse phenomenon in countries
characterized by sufficiently inclusive and democratic institutions. In particular, the authors
introduce an empirical measure of the quality of institutions, by differentiating between
producer-friendy and grabberfriendy institutions. While the former are characterized by a
complementarity between rent-seeking attitudes and production, the latter feature a
competitive nature of the relationship between rent-seeking and production-based activities.
In countries characterized by grabber-friendly institutions funds are directed to unproductive
uses and entrepreneurial activity is not supported by the State. Melhum et al. (2006)
articulate their empirical model of this "Institutional Interpretation" on the basis of four
propositions: (1) a high quality of institutions fosters the achievement of a production
equilibrium, while a low institutional quality concurs in the creation of a grabber equilibrium; (2)
the abundance of natural resources can be considered as a blessing for a country
characterized by a production equilibrium and a curse for a country represented by a grabber
equilibrium; (3) the creation of producer-friendly institutions in a country characterized by a
grabber equilibrium determines an increase in the level of national income for the country,
while the income of an already producer-friendly country is not affected by the increase in
9 SINGER, H.W., 1950. The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries. The American Economic
Review, 40(2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-second Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Asociation), p. 482.
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the producer-friendly metrics; (4) the increase in the number of entrepreneurs in a country
identified by a grabber equilibrium causes an increase in the number of producers and a
decrease in the number of rent-seekers, making both activities more profitable. Proposition
(1) and (2) suggest that for countries affected by the resource curse, the displacement income
effect, diluting national income as entrepreneurs leave production activities to focus on
grabbing ones, is significantly greater than the immediate income effect, according to which the
resource abundance initially spurs growth in national income. Proposition (3) indicates that
the muliplier attached to producer-friendly institutions is greater for countries stuck in a
grabber equilibrium; in my opinion this result is very significant in that it conveys the
positive message that the resource-curse affected countries are "more elastic" to the
introduction of producer-friendly institutions. In less economic terms, this result has
powerfil implications in terms of policy implementation; even a marginal improvement in
the producer friendly character of those countries' institutions might be extremely beneficial
to the country as a whole.
2.2 Botswana: a "minimization strategy" of the curse
As discussed already in paragraph 1.1 above, Botswana's history contributed to the
formation and preservation of inclusive, democratic and growth-fostering institutions.
Several elements prove that the country has until now been able to avoid the negative impact
of the resource curse, by effectively capitalizing on its mineral endowment to foster a long-
lasting development.
Despite its positive growth record, Botswana's economy is still characterized by
some elements that could potentially facilitate the realization of at least some of the resource
curse dynamics. For instance, the mining industry, inherently capital-intensive, does not
create employment opportunities proportionally to the GDP growth it generates in the
country. As pointed out by Iimi (2006)'* while mining production's value added in terms of
GDP amounts to 40%, the sector is able to contribute to just 4% of the country's
employment. In addition to it, the landlocked nature of Botswana's territory imposes fairly
high shipping costs on its sizable exports of natural resources. Despite the notorious De
10 IIMI, A., 2006. Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse?. IMF Working Paper, p. 9. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=910703.
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Beer's ad, diamonds are not forever and Botswana's reserves have been depleting since the
beginning of extractive activities in 1966; sooner or later, the production capacity of mines
will be exhausted. Also, the marginal investment to extend the useful life of a mine is
considerable; for instance, Debswana, the joint venture between De Beers and the
Government of Botswana, plans to conduct an investment in the order of Pula 24bn,
equivalent to nearly US$3bn", to extend the useful life of the Jwaneng mine until 2025. Not
only these extensions projects are significantly more expensive than the initial investment in
the mine, but they also cause significant environmental damage because of the excessive
waste they generate with respect to the initial exploitation period.
Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS), 2002
Sub-
South L11 MI HI
Botswana Lesotho Narnibia Swaziland Saharan
Afirica Countries Countries Countries
Africa
Voice&Accountability 0.75 0.53 0.66 0.75 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.57 0.82
Political Stability 0.78 0.57 0.69 0.52 0.64 0.45 0.40 0.59 0.82
Government 0.66 0.40 0.48 0.59 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.42 0.77
Effectiveness
Quality of Regulation 0.72 0.44 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.38 0.34 0.51 0.85
Rule of Law 0.67 0.48 0.60 0.53 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.47 0.84
contro1of corruption 0.62 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.36 0.29 0.25 0.39 0.76
Source: KAUFMANN, D., KRAAY, A., MASTRUZZI, M., 2003. Governance Matters III: Governance Indicatorsfor
1996-2002. The World Bank. Available at: http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/topic/governance
As show in in the Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS) table
above, Botswana scores very well both in absolute and in relative terms with respect to the
GRICS metrics created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). The country has
implemented several measures in order to foster positive governance over time. For
instance, in terms of Government Effectiveness Botswana has introduced the Budget
Sustainability Ratio (BSR), also called Sustainable Budget index (SBI)", in order to monitor
the use of mineral revenues for the financing of investment-based and recurrent
t Debswana (2013) Cut-8 Sponsors Jwaneng Hospital Expansion. [online] Available at:
http://www.debswana.com/News/Pages/Hospital%20Expansion.aspx
12 In the table: LI = Low-Income, MI - Middle-Income, HI = High-Income.
1 AFRICAN ECONOMIC OULOOK, 2012. Equatorial Guinea 2012, p. 6. Available at:
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Equatorial%20Guinea%2Full%20P
DF%20Country/o20Note.pdf
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expenditures focused on development, education, and health. This initiative proves that the
government is already proactively planning for the moment in which a uniquely resource-
driven growth will be unsustainable. The government has also issued a fiscal rule capping
public expenditures at 40% of GDP; a Pula Fund has been created with a preventive motive
and it only includes transparent investments in long-term financial assets.
According to Art. 3 in the Mines and Mineral Act: "Subject to the provision of the
Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act, all rights of ownership in minerals are vested in the
Republic and the Minister shall ensure, in the public interest, that the mineral resources of the
Republic are investigated and exploited in the most efficient, beneficial and timely
manner."1 * In terms of Regulation and Interaction with private parties, the government limits a
maximum lease term of its land to 25 years. The remarkable involvement and positive
relation of the government with the private sector, a topic that will be further analyzed in
Chapter 6, is proven by Botswana's 50% ownership of the company Debswana in
partnership with De Beers. Since when mine exploitation started in 1966 the interaction
between the two parties has always been prosperous, leading to a progressive concentration
of the De Beers diamond business in this African country. It is therefore not surprising that
the diamond giant has decided to transfer its Diamond Trading Company (DTC) operations,
through which it manages the worldwide supply (and price) of diamonds, in Gaborone
starting from the end of 2013. This scheme is significant especially if considered from the
long-term perspective of Botswana's sustainable development. The concentration of the
majority of sorting and trading activities in Botswana will allow the country to become "the
hub" in the market for diamonds despite the progressive depletion of its national mineral
reserves. By differentiating the economy in the downward segment of the diamond value
chain, the government of Botswana has cooperated with De Beers to ensure a long-term
sustainable development of the country.
In terms of anti-corruption policies, Botswana has created in 1994 the Directorate of
Corruption and Economic crime; this body is in charge of monitoring the record of
corruption in the political, public and private sphere, and to report directly to the President
about potential corruption cases.
14 REPUBIC OF BOTSWANA, 1999. Mines and Mineral Act no. 17 of 1999. Supplement A- Government
Gazette dated 17 September, 1999, p. 121. Available at:
http://www.mines.gov.bw/mines%20and%20minerals%20%2OAct.pdf
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According to the econometric model developed in limi (2006), conditional on the
presence of a sufficiently high quality of governance and democratic institutions, a country
will benefit from its resource endowment in forwarding a sustainable economic
development. In my personal opinion, this "institutional requirement" is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the attainment of sustainable growth path; other elements, as the one
presented in paragraph 2.1 above, have to be present in order to guarantee this positive
result.
Clearly, Botswana still faces some challenges in terms of ensuring the sustainability
of its growth path. First of all, the country should improve its fiscal position, especially in
consideration of the substantial health expenditures related to reducing the grievous
HIV/AIDS incidence. In this respect, a fund should be created from the mineral sector-
generated revenues and specifically dedicated to fighting this illness; the fund should be
invested in fairly safe and long-term assets so as to ensure the financial resources' availability
at least in the medium term.
In addition to it, the allocation of fiscal revenues, mineral rents, and savings
mechanisms should be monitored and regulated in order to limit the negative impact that
natural resources' price volatility has on national finances; the change in this international
price cannot usually be predicted well in advance, and countries generally struggle to cope
with it in a precipitated manner.
2.3 Equatorial Guinea: maximizing the curse's odds
As mentioned in Mogae (2006), oil and diamonds have different implications on the
government's incentive to cooperate with private parties; due to the diamonds' longer initial
investment recovery period, a company as De Beers has a stronger incentive to collaborate
and nurture a positive long-lasting relationship with the government of the country in which
it is located. The same incentive is valid on the government's side.
The handling of the resource curse phenomenon in Equatorial Guinea is unfortunately
incomparable to Botswana's one. The former has neither implemented such measures as
investing in a fund to foster a long-term sustainable development, nor it has adopted
forward-looking fiscal regulations to prevent the resource curse's materialization. Instead,
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Equatoguinean oil rents are squandered in items like a $30m villa in Malibu, a $38.5m jet, a
C150m htelparticu/er in Paris, or Rodin's and Bonnard's artistic masterpieces valued at E1.5
and E2.1 respectively that we hope Teodoro Nguema Obiang, Teodorin for the friends, will
be able to appreciate. The balance sheet of Equatorial Guinea is astonishingly simple: the
majority of its source of funds originates from oil rents, and the uses of funds are directed at
incrementing the President's friends and family circle, thereby making the nearly US$20bn
GDP in 2011'5 totally fictitious. The Equatoguinean population does not benefit at all from
the oil rents; in this country, democracy is just an illusion.
Oil reserves' exploitation started in 1996 in Equatorial Guinea, forty years later than
the mineral exploration took off in Botswana. Now the country is the fourth 6 supplier of oil
in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria, Angola, and Congo, countries to which it is not even
comparable in terms of size. Given its limited population of 720,213 in 2011, Equatorial
Guinea could really improve the standard of leaving of the majority of its people if it
allocated oil rents in an economically efficient manner; this potential will never be realized
unless a drastic change of government accompanied by a significant institutional
improvement occurs. It suffices to think that the country has already applied several times to
be part of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), but rejected because not
compliant with the minimum entry requirements in terms of corruption.
The resource, in this case, is truly a curse in that it exacerbates the problems of
negative governance and extractive institutions that were already afflicting Equatorial Guinea
before 1996. To aggravate these dynamics, the country is highly dependent on the
international price of oil, whose volatility has a very unsettling impact on national finances.
In more technical terms, the Beta of Equatorial Guinea's revenues with respect to the oil
market is very close to one; the real appreciation of the country's exchange rate has very
damaging impact on the manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP, making it less
competitive on the international markets and a possible victim of the Dutch Disease.
McSherry (2006)"1 established a parallelism between Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria
in terms of their "resource curse" experience. The increase in Equatoguinean inflation has
not only negatively impacted the population's already weak purchasing power, but it has also
is Please see Appendix 8.1.
1 Please see Appendix 8.4.
7 MCSHERRY, B., 2006. The Political Economy of Oil in Equatorial Guinea. African Studies Quartery, 8(3), pp.
25-45.
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caused a 15% exchange rate appreciation in the period 2001-2003. Cocoa production, once a
dominant component of Equatorial Guinea's competitive advantage, decreased by 30% in
the five years from 1996 to 2001; investments were progressively concentrated on the oil
sector and the rest of the economy became less competitive because of the exchange rate
appreciation.
Since the Zafiro field discovery by ExxonMobil in 1995, the "Kuwait of Africa" did
not generate any positive externality in economic sectors other than the oil industry. Still
now, the majority of the country's people are subsistence farmers, thus denying any sort of
integration in the market economy.
As it will be further developed in Chapter 6, the Equatoguinean government has put
afafade showing both a concern with its population's living conditions and a commitment to
foster employment by mandating to foreign companies a minimum "local content" in the
procurement of workers and products. The government is also cooperating with private
companies in order to entice their humanitarian help and investment to eradicate malaria.
However, these are just minor initiatives in comparison to the colossal human development
work that needs to be done in the country.
Both Equatorial Guinea and Botswana are Rentiers countries, whose economy is
mainly sustained by the external rents generated through the natural resource exploitation,
while little value added is produced by the manufacturing sector. If Botswana shows a
marginally better record in terms of economic diversification, it creates a much greater
discrepancy in terms of human development, inclusiveness of institutions, and governance.
As it will be developed below, international organizations, private companies, and other
stakeholders in the Equatoguinean growth model should be more actively involved in
shaping the economic development of the country. It follows that if the improvement
cannot originate from the inside, it should by necessity be generated and implemented from
outside the country.
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3. Analysis of Growth Acceleration and Development
3.1 A Technical Definition of Growth Acceleration
Husmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) provide the definition of "growth acceleration"
that will be used in this paper to analyze the development stories of Botswana and
Equatorial Guinea. As per their logic, a grwth acceleration episode is identified by the
following criteria:
1. Increase in per capita GDP of at least 2% during a certain year T (the majority of the
yearly growth episodes are still above this lower bound);
2. Growth record to be sustained for at least eight year;
3. Growth in GDP per capita in the post-acceleration period to be at least 3.5% per year;
4. Post-acceleration output level greater than the pre-acceleration one (guaranteeing the
sustainability of this growth episode).
These growth acceleration criteria will be applied to Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
that, having benefited enormously from natural resources' discovery in the twentieth
century, qualify for the definition of growth acceleration.
The development outlook presented for both Equatorial Guinea and Botswana will
be fairly rich and heterogeneous in terms of content so as to create a comprehensive and
complete view on their growth stories.
3.2 The case of Botswana: a "shared" growth acceleration
Hausmann et al. (2005) criteria have been applied to Botswana in the year 1968; the
"T" identifying the beginning of the growth acceleration episode corresponds to the year of the
diamonds' first discovery in Botswana by De Beers. As shown in Appendix 8.1, since the
increase in GDP per capita growth between 1967 and 1968 amounts to 4.41%, Botswana
satisfies the first criterion of at least a 2% increase in GDP per capita growth between the
year of the growth take-off and the previous year. Botswana's yearly growth is generally well
above 3.5% during the eight years following T; the second of the Hausmann et al. (2005)
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criterion is thus satisfied. The fulfillment of third requirement is proved by the $313,182,708
increase in output from the year 1967 (T-1) and the year 1976 (T+8).
Ergo, Botswana clearly benefited from a growth acceleration episode starting in the
year 1968 and spurred by a diamonds' discovery fostering development dynamics over
several years'".
Appendix 8.2 shows the sources of value added as a percentage of GDP, thereby
providing a useful snapshot of the country's major economic activities. The structure of the
economy in 2011 differs enormously with respect to the one in 1960, when the sectors of
agriculture and services were very balanced in their contribution to GDP and together they
provided for 87% of the country's GDP. Especially in the period 1975-1980, the sector of
Agriculture was progressively "crowded-out" by industrial activity. The area of Services
roughly maintained its magnitude over time, but its composition is different with respect to
the past; the majority of the services are now mainly directed at the industrial sector. In 2011,
Agriculture just contributes to the 3% of GDP, while Industry's value added has greatly
increased to the level of 46%. Manufacturing's GDP contribution has decreased from a level
of 12% in 1965 to 4% in 2011; again, the sector of Agriculture has been crowded out by the
economic predominance of Industry following the diamond's discovery.
The facts exposed above confirm one of the precepts characterizing much of the
resource curse literature. When a country's economy is overly based on a resource and its
related sectors, other activities tend to be "crowded out" or "phased out" as a consequence
of this excessive national specialization. The increase in the country's real exchange rate
reduces its level of competitiveness on international markets, making its exports more
expensive and its imports cheaper. The country will need to invest the funds gained from the
"resource-related activity" in order to diversify its economy and regain its competitiveness in
international markets.
In terms of diamonds production, Botswana's performance is remarkable on both a
global and regional scale. As shown in Appendix 8.3, in 2011 the country contributed the
27% to the world production of diamonds in terms of value and 18% in terms of actual
output. Botswana is in fact the reservoir of the worlds' most valuable and gem-quality
18 For reference, please notice in Appendix 8.1 the table related to Botswana in the period 1968-1990.
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diamonds and its market positioning is different with respect to the one of Russia, which is
the biggest producer in terms of actual output but second to Botswana in terms of value.
The African country's central role in the diamonds' international market justifies the recent
decision by De Beers to transfer the Diamond Trading Company in Gaborone at the end of
2013, making therefore Botswana the global hub for diamond trade.
Appendix 8.5 reports a list of social indicators characterizing Botswana. We find a
confirmation of the country's progressive specialization on the Industrial sector in the
demographic statistics; since 1965 individuals started leaving the countryside to move to
cities. The rural population decreased from 96% of the total population in 1965 to a level of
38% in 2011. Conversely, the urban population increased in the same period from a level of
4% to 62%. In terms of health meics, while birth rate and fertility rate significantly
diminished from 1960 to 2011, consistently with industrialization dynamics, the reduction in
death rate is not at all acceptable in the same 50-year period; this fact is especially concerning
given that Botswana benefited from a significant increase in income per capita and FDI
inflow in the same period. The cause for an almost steady death rate is attributed to the
alarming increase in HIV prevalence. In 2011, nearly one quarter of the entire population in
the 15-49 age group was affected by this virus. Several measures have already been taken by
the government to counter this threat to people's health, and companies as De Beers have
extensively invested in educating their employees about appropriate behavioral norms.
Finally, both primary and secondary education statistics improved over the period 1975-2011,
indicating that the industrialization dynamics also created significant learning opportunities
for local people; secondary education has increased at a greater rate than the primary one.
In order to properly understand the main features of Botswana' economy the focus
is now turned to the Balance of Payments reported in Appendix 8.7. The Current Account was at
a remarkable level of 6,9% of GDP in 2008 before the global financial crisis hit Botswana's
trade balance badly in 2009 as a result of a drop in global demand for luxury goods
(including diamonds). During 2009 and 2010 Botswana presented current account deficits
driven by a greater increase in imports with respect to exports; both deficits were however
greater than -5% of GDP, threshold commonly used to measure the sustainability of a
country's trade situation. From 2011 onwards Botswana has regained its positive trade
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position and the current account balance is projected by the IMF to progressively increase
until 2017. Raw materials in general and diamonds in particular drive the trade surplus, and
they represent respectively 84% and 72% of the country's total exports. On the contrary,
Services and Income will be mainly imported from abroad in the future and no reversing
tendency is expected to occur at least until 2017. Despite the initiatives promoted in terms of
economic diversification, the country is still overly dependent on diamonds. Also, the
deterioration of Botswana's trade balance since the year 2013 is expected to be more than
compensated by the increase in income and transfers inflows, whose related balance presents
levels consistently above 7% of GDP over the whole period.
The Financial Account suffers a sharp decline until 2017, when it is projected to
represent just 2% of its value in 2008. By looking closely at these figures, we notice that
despite the fairly stable level of the Foreign Direct Investment account, both the Portfolio
Investment and the Other Investment turn negative respectively in year 2009 and 2013.
These declines are explained on the Assets side by the increase in Botswana's investments
abroad, and on the Liability side by the increase in debts' or other securities' repayments to
foreigners. Evidence for this assertion is found in the decomposition of the account "Other
Investment"; interestingly enough, the government's long-term debt repayment is the main
driver of the increasingly negative "Other investment" liability account. In terms of these
investments' nature, a positive element is presented by the greater magnitude of long-term
FDI inflows with respect to the short-term Portfolio Investment one; Botswana is not overly
reliant on "hot money" that could dry up on the basis of the investors' sentiment.
The Terms of Trade ratio has been fairly volatile over time, clearly indicating the
country's role of natural resource exporter. IMF estimates present a progressive increase in
the ratio during the period 2013-2017, signaling a consistent increase in the price of
exportable goods with respect to the one of importable goods.
Finally, Botswana's Reserve position is very solid and improving over the period
considered. The measure of "Months of imports covered by Reserves" is consistently well
above the level of 6 months, threshold defining the sustainability of a country's stance in
terms of Reserves.
Botswana's performance as to exports is shown in Appendix 8.9. The snapshot
presented in Table 1 proves that the country has progressively shifted its resource towards
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the mining sector at the expense of the agricultural one; if once meat was one of the main
exports characterizing Botswana's economy, now agricultural raw materials exports as a
percentage of merchandise exports have been nearly halved in the period from 2000 to 2011.
Ores and metal exports evidently make up the greatest proportion of merchandise exports;
this ratio has significantly increased over time from 6.97% in 2000 to reach 14.54% in 2010,
after reaching the peak of 23.28% in the pre-crisis 2007. Manufactures exports have been
declining over time, indicating that Botswana should implement additional programs to
diversify its economy from mineral resources. Since ICT and communications-related
services have been acquiring importance in terms of exports in the 2000-2011 period,
Botswana could leverage on this initial base to specialize further in these sectors and foster
its economy's diversification. More specifically, Graph 1 shows that Pearls, Precious Stones
and Minerals represent more than 85% of all Botswana's exports, the 98% of this category
being composed by diamonds (Graph 2). In spite of the fact that the United Kingdom is
represented as being by far the major importer of Botswana's diamonds globally, the figure is
not fully representative of the true global demand for the resource; the origin of the figure
instead derives from the fact that the DTC, the De Beers' division managing the worldwide
supply of diamonds, is exactly located in London. All diamonds are first sent to London to
be sorted and organized in different batches ready for sale to other locations internationally.
Also, Graph 1 presents Vehicles as the fourth major source of Botswana's exports. In the
optic of economic diversification, this positive result is indicative of the economic potential
that could be released from this sector. With Volvo and Hyundai being the two major
players in Botswana's automotive sector, exports of vehicles started decreasing since the
latter's assembly plant was closed in 2000. The decrease in this sector's economic weight was
mainly due to South Africa's protectionist attitude and to the strong pressure exercised by
this country's lobby; being South Africa the major regional actor in the automotive sector, it
has by all means discouraged the emergence of potential competitive pressures from
Botswana. An analysis of this specific market is above the scope of this paper, but I just
underline here that Botswana should persevere to attract investments in this sector in order
to further its objective of economic diversification. The idiosyncratic national advantages
that would guarantee an inflow of funds in the country are: political stability, positive and
growing economic performance, direct market access to South African Customs Union
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(SACU), negligible degree of corruption and violence, lack of exchange controls, and low tax
rate.
In terms of its investment position, Botswana scores higher than Equatorial Guinea; its
annual inflow of foreign investment increased by a remarkable 41% since 2008, showing a
lower record than South Africa's 51% but a significantly better one than Namibia's 22%19
(Appendix 8.11). On the flipside, Botswana's investment abroad has decreased since 2008 by
an average of 11% per annum, meaning that national resources have been concentrated
towards internal development.
In Appendix 8.12 Botswana is represented in terms of its potential to attract
investment. The majority of the foreign investment is concentrated in the primary sector: the
country generates an impressive 5.4% of international trade in mining and quarrying
specialized on the resource of diamonds. Trade conditions in this sector are particularly
favorable in the country; with respect to the sector of Mining and Quarrying Botswana's
average tariffs faced and applied amount to respectively 5% and 0.2%. These values are very
small if compared to the secondary sector of food, beverages and tobacco, in which
Botswana's average tariff faced and applied are respectively 16.7% and 11%. The country is
also fairly active in the market of Motor vehicles and other transport eqpment with total exports of
$145m in 2011; the average tariff faced and applied are respectively 8.7% and 5.1%, levels
that can be considered fairly low relative to national standards in other sectors. In spite of
the potential competitive advantage presented by this sector, the intrinsic complexities of the
national tax code caused the loss of such multinational companies as Volvo and Hyundai at
the end of their tax holidays. Given the highly beneficial nature of a diversification in the
automotive sector, the government should simplify the tax code and provide economic
incentives to attract car companies in the country. Other two sectors in which Botswana
could potentially emphasize its diversification efforts are Textiles, clothing and leather, and Metal
and Metalproducts, representing respectively exports $263m and $458m; tariffs characterizing
the latter industry are significantly lower relative to the former one. Botswana is not
particularly active in the tertiary sector; it is however a major recipient of FDI in the financial
industry, that certainly supports "real" activities as the management and trade of diamonds.
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19 Please, see Appendix 8.11.
In Appendix 8.14 Botswana and Equatorial Guinea are compared to other major
global players respectively in the industries of mining and oil. Table 1 represents Botswana's
position as the fifth major contributor of international trade in the mining sector,
characterized by a 0.8% share of global commerce in the resource. Its 12.1% growth in
annual FDI inflow, even if remarkable by global standards, is not one of the highest if
compared to the other eight countries in the sample. As a final observation, the government
of Botswana is clearly committed to liberalizing trade in the mineral resources, as indicated
by the very low level of tariff applied at 0.2%.
3.3 A discriiminatory rnodel of developmernt in Equatorial Guinea
Exxon Mobil discovered Equatoguinean oil reserves in 1995, year that will be
considered as "T" for the purposes of the growth acceleration analysis. In fact, the 8.9%
improvement in GDP per capita growth between 1994 (T-1) and 1995 (1) not only confirms
the appropriateness of the choice of the year 1995 as "T", but it also satisfies the first
Hausmann et al. (2005) criterion. As for the second requirement, it is fully satisfied by the
outstanding Equatoguinean growth records between 1995 (T) and 2003 (T+8). Finally the
$2,826,615,266 output increase between 2003 (7+8) and 1994 (T-1) provides evidence for
the fulfillment of the third criterion.
As a result, Equatorial Guinea evidently benefited from a growth acceleration
episode thanks to the 1995 oil discovery; despite the fulfillment of all the criteria presented
by Hausmann et al. (2005), a deeper analysis proves that this country's wealth has not been
equally distributed among its people.
This element might constitute a partial critique to the Hausmann et al. (2005)
measure. It is arguable that a growth acceleration episode should be defined as such only if
its benefits are fairly distributed in an equitable manner across its people; otherwise, the
increase in output might well correspond to a great wealth windfall to the advantage of just a
restricted circle of individuals (i.e. President Obiang Nguema and his "friends & family"); a
similar occurrence would not qualify as a development episode improving the population's
standards of living. As a result, I think that it would be appropriate to always complement
the Haussman et al. (2005) growth acceleration measure with an indication of income
inequality as the Gini coefficient. The two statistics might be used in tandem in order to
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provide a more transparent and straightforward measure of the country's distribution of the
wealth gained as a result of its growth acceleration.
After this brief methodological digression, the analysis of development in Equatorial
Guinea is presented below, according to a plurality of parameters as it has been done with
Botswana in section 3.2 above.
In the same way as observed for Botswana in Appendix 8.2, the share of value added
from Agriculture has diminished in Equatorial Guinea from 69% in 1985 to 2% 2008,
indicating the shift of investments towards oil production. In fact, the Industrial sector's
contribution to GDP has skyrocketed from 11% in 1990, before the discovery of the
country's oil reserves, to a staggering level of 96% in 2008. The increasing contribution from
the Manufacturing sector indicates a possible intensification in the country's diversification
efforts towards manufacturing activities still related to oil production.
Equatorial Guinea's value added snapshot presents an excessive economic
specialization that, if not appropriately managed, could potentially lead to the realization of
the resource curse.
For what concerns oil production, despite its very small size relative to other major
market players, Equatorial Guinea is the fourth largest producer of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa
after Nigeria, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo20. As we can notice from the second
graph in Appendix 8.4, Equatorial Guinea in 2011 contributed 4% of the oil production by
the major African countries. In the first graph, instead, we see that Equatorial Guinea,
differently from Botswana, is not one of the top-three global player in the market for its
resource; but, controlling for the very small size of the country, the country should still be
considered as a significant player in the oil market.
Differently from Botswana, the Equatoguinean population still predominantly lives in
the countryside and in the 1960-2011 period the urban population increased by just 15%
from 25% to 40% (Appendix 8.6). This demographic fact is reflected in a considerably
greater size of the Equatoguinean people living in poverty in comparison to Botswana; a
2 Being the difference in production between Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of the Congo not
significant, we can consider the two countries as producing on the same scale.
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much lower number of people in the former country have the means to move to cities.
With respect to health dynamics, in the 52 years considered the birth rate has not decreased
much and the fertility rate has been fairly stable; on an imaginary continuum measuring
development and industrialization, Equatorial Guinea is currently far from Botswana. As
counterintuitive as it might be, the very small discrepancy in 2011 death rates between the
two countries is determined by the fact that Equatorial Guinea is characterized by a much
lower HIV prevalence than its counterpart, generating a difference of 18% in 2011. Despite
the lack of sufficient data for education, we notice that primary enrollment increases especially
in the first decade of the XX* century, while secondary education still lags behind.
In this section, reference is made to Appendix 8.8 that reports Equatorial Guinea's
Balance of Payments. The Cumnt Account balance, positive from 2006 to 2008, turns negative in
2009 and presents a concerning ratio of -16% of GDP, well below the "sustainability
threshold" of -5%. The global financial crisis was certainly the driver of this large deficit,
which is maintained through 2010. The deteriorating trade balance is explained by the fact
that starting in 2009 exports decrease and imports increase. Also, the country imports
progressively more services from abroad and more funds in the form of current transfers
and income. The Equatoguinean economy is even more dependent on oil exports than
Botswana is on diamonds; in 2010 Hydrocarbons made up the 99% of Equatorial Guinea's
total exports, thereby enhancing the country's vulnerability to changes in the price of oil.
In terms of its Financial Account, the country's Direct Investment in 2009 was even
greater than its pre-crisis level in 2007; given the considerable magnitude of this long-term
source of funding with respect to the more volatile Portfolio Investment, the country is not
excessively vulnerable to shifts in investors' sentiment. This fact is also explained by the
long-term nature of foreign investments characterizing the oil sector. This resource's exports
are expected to have increased after the financial crisis's negative impact noticeable in the
year 2009.
Since Equatorial Guinea is part of the Central Africa currency union, the Communautt
economique et mondtaire de l'Afiique centrale (CEMAC) adopting the Franc CFA, its Resemes'
position cannot be considered independently of the one of its "monetary partners". The
ratio of the country's reserves at the BEAC (Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale) over
the gross official foreign assets decreases from 72% in 2006 to 44% in 2010, in line with the
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trend in Government deposits at the BEAC over the total Reserves. The reserves handled by
the BEAC are not sustainable in 2006 and 2007 (below 6 months of imports) before
improving in 2008 and reaching an acceptable level of 8 months of imports. The
Equatoguinean reserves position is certainly less sustainable than the one proper to
Botswana; however, the two results are not fully comparable since while Botswana retains its
control over monetary policy, Equatorial Guinea has granted it to the BEAC and it only
allows the analysis of the reserve position of the currency union in its complex.
In Appendix 8.10 we notice that Equatorial Guinea's exports of goods and services as
a percentage of GDP have decreased over time from 2000 to 2011, and especially so after
the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008; they have been slowly recovering since the
end of 2010. In Graph 2 Equatorial Guinea's dependence on crude oil as a source national
wealth is shown by the overwhelming proportion of exports generated just by mineral fuels,
oil and distillation products, amounting to a total of more than 92% of total exports. As
displayed in Graph 3, the 77% of these $12B exports rents generated by the category of
mineral fuels is generated by crude oil alone, the 22% by petroleum gases, and a negligible
1% by non-crude oils. In terms of major partner countries, Graph 4 reveals that in 2012
France surpassed both China and the USA in terms of imports of Equatoguinean oil;
France's access to the resource is certainly facilitated by the ex-colonial ties preserved with
countries belonging to the CEMAC area. In Graph I Equatorial Guinea and Botswana 2010
records in terms of exports of goods and services over GDP are respectively compared to
other CEMAC countries and to Namibia and South Africa. Both of our countries of interest
score second in their respective rankings, Equatorial Guinea with an impressive 70% and
Botswana with a 33% of exports over GDP. As a result, and in regional and in sectors-
specific comparisons, both Botswana and Equatorial Guinea offer outstanding performances
in terms of exports of goods and services. However, if compared to one another, Equatorial
Guinea has a more solid exporter status than Botswana; oil, unfortunately essential to most
of the modern economic activity, is characterized by a greater global demand than diamonds.
In the "Investment Map" shown in Appendix 8.11, both Equatorial Guinea and
Botswana are included in the group of countries attracting between $1m and $6.3bn in terms
of investment from abroad. Equatorial Guinea presents the greatest value of annual FDI
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inflow and inward stock per capita if compared to other CEMAC countries, because of the
substantial foreign investments in the oil sector and the very small size of the country's
population (Table 1, Appendix 11). Since 2008, the FDI inflow in Equatorial Guinea has
increased by a 20.3% per year. This growth in foreign investment, certainly positive in the
short-term, could however hinder the country's long-term development performance; it
would not only increase the country's dependence on foreign investments directed at the oil
sector, but it would also make it a potential victim of the "resource curse".
As confirmed by the table in Appendix 8.13, Equatorial Guinea is predominantly
active in the primary sector. It covers the 0.6% of international trade in crude oil, a remarkable
result especially in consideration of the small country size; average tariffs faced and applied
in this industry are respectively 4.6% and 9.8%, low if compared to the tariffs applied to
other sectors and therefore encouraging trade in this industry. In addition to it, Equatorial
Guinea provides for the 0.3% of international commerce in the sector of Foresty and Fishing
because of its rich wood endowment; in this respect, Equatorial Guinea should invest more
in the Forestry sector so as to diversify its economy from the oil sector. Motor Vehicles and
other transport equipment, Coke, Petroleum products and nuclearfuel and Chemical and Chemicalproducts
are three of the activities in the secondary sector in which Equatorial Guinea seems to be
engaging, export figures are respectively $437.4m, $377.1m and $344.2m. Consistently with
the economic specialization in the oil industry, the lowest tariffs in the secondary sector are
represented in the industry of Coke, Petroleumproducts and nuclearfuel Equatorial Guinea is not
involved in any tertiary sector activity. It is therefore clear that the majority of the national
resources are spent on fostering the development of the oil industry, at the expenses of all
other sectors that are characterized by generally greater tariff levels. Because of its lower
level of economic diversification, Equatorial Guinea seems more vulnerable than Botswana
to a future threat of the resource curse.
As displayed in Appendix 8.14, Equatorial Guinea's 0.6% share in the world
international trade in crude oil is not among the greatest levels in the sample, but it is still
considerable especially if controlling for the small country size. After Angola's staggering
level of 20% tariff applied, Equatorial Guinea, Congo and Gabon present the next highest
level of tariff at 9.8%, thus revealing these countries' expropriatory and protectionist nature
of the resource management practices conducted by an overly corrupted public sector.
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4. Interplay between Institutions and Development
4.1 Botswana: the "institutional outlier" of Africa
4.1.1 The main attributes of virtuous domestic institutions
The quality of a country's institutions is a powerful determinant of its economic
development. Even if no direct and mutually exclusive causality can be established between
the two elements, a correlation certainly exists between them.
As regards institutional quality and political pluralism, Botswana is an outlier in
Africa. Even before the establishment of the British Protectorate in 1885, the kgot/a, general
assembly of adult males, ensured a fair degree of centralization of the administrative power;
this body was allowed to disagree with the chief and to overrule his decisions. Also, the
appointment of the chief was not uniquely based on hereditary ties; only the most talented
individuals could achieve this position, irrespective of their family origins. In this respect, a
Tswana proverb21 claims "kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe," meaning "The King is King by the
grace of the people".
Most Sub-Saharan countries experienced after independence the establishment of
such extractive institutions similar to the ones installed during the colonial period; the
existence of sufficiently inclusive and pluralistic institutions in the pre-colonial Botswana as
well as the lack of interest in imposing control on the protectorate of Bechuanaland by the
British ensured the persistence of a positive and sustainable institutional infrastructure. In
terms of economic institutions, property rights were respected in Botswana; cattle, the most
valuable resource until the discovery of diamonds, were held communally but owned
privately and initially distributed by the chief to members of the elite. With the 1967
establishment of a marketing board, the Botswana Meat Commission, several measures were
implemented to develop the market for cattle, as the installation of fences in order to fight
the spread of the foot-and-mouth disease. The introduction of the Chieftancy Act of 1965
and of the Chieftancy Amendment Act of 1970 eliminated the chief's right to allocate land
and cattle, and introduced the right for the President to depose the Chief.
2 1 ACEMOGLU, D., and ROBINSON, J., 2012. Wy Nations Fail. Crown Publishing Group, New York. p.
408.
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President Khama's legislative amendment vesting all subsoil mineral rights in the
nation and not in the single tribes, as well as the existence of a fair degree of state
centralization and of pluralistic institutions prevented diamonds from becoming the source
of civil wars and from gaining the appellation of "Blood Diamonds". Instead, this mineral
resource provided Botswana with a stronger fiscal base to be invested productively in the
country's economic development.
A measure of the quality of political institutions is presented in Table 4 (Appendix 16).
According to the measures provided by the Polity IV project, Botswana scores very highly
on both Democray and Polity indexes, with a value of 8 out of 10 on both and surpassed only
by South Africa in its region. The country is aligned with both Namibia and South Africa on
the highest score of 4 for the Openness of executive recruitment, and with South Africa only on
the top score of 7 for the measure of Executive Constraints. All three countries present a
remarkable 9 out of 10 on political competition.
In terms of Corruption Perception Index (Table 1, Appendix 16) Botswana has
always outperformed its neighbors Namibia and South Africa since the year 1998, and while
its ranking improved by two positions from 2005 to 2012, Namibia's and South Africa's
ones worsened respectively by 11 and 13 positions in those same seven years. Botswana is
the country with the highest CPI index value in Africa, and is ranked at the 30*fi position
globally. It is followed by Cape Verde, ranked 39' on the 185-countries CPI list.
The eleven Doing Business indicators (Table 3, Appendix 16) provide a very good
outlook on the quality of the country's economic institutions. Botswana is the best
performer in its region on the measures of Registering Proper and Resolving Insolvency; it should
however invest in reducing the number of procedures, amount of time and related costs in
Dealing with Construction Permits and Trading Across Borders, measures on which the discrepancy
with its neighbors is significant. iUkewise, while performing very highly (32* position) on the
Paying Taxes measure, the country should commit to improve its 99*fi rank on Starting a
Business. Overall, on the Ease of Doing Business measure Botswana is ranked 59f on a global
scale, twenty position lower than South Africa but twenty-eight position higher than
Namibia. In terms of economic development, South Africa is clearly at a more advanced
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stage than Botswana, but if we qualitatively control for this temporal discrepancy in terms of
growth-takeoff, Botswana's performance has undoubtedly to be considered as a remarkable
one.
As a further confirmation of Botswana's regional superiority, Standard & Poors
foreign currency rating22 for Botswana is A- (Table 2, Appendix 16), while South Africa's
and Namibia's ones are respectively BBB and "not rated"; Botswana benefits from a greater
economic wellbeing and safer market conditions not only in comparison to African but also
regional standards.
In terms of Income distribution, Botswana's 60.69 Gini coefficient in 1994 was better
than the ones of South Africa in 2009 and Namibia in 2004 (Table 5, Appendix 16). Despite
the temporal discrepancy between these three measures, the comparison is maintained as a
valid one since the Gini coefficient volatility from year to year is moderate or even negligible.
Income inequality is a common cause for internal instability and lack of peace. The Global
Peace Index, the global leading measure of peace promoted by illustrious personalities as
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, former US President Jimmy Carter, economist
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus and the Dalai Lama, is been reported in
Table 6 (Appendix 16). Botswana, ranked 31" globally, outperforms by far South Africa and
Namibia, respectively ranked 127* and 49. It seems therefore clear that Botswana's
dedicated leaders, inclusive political and economic institutions, lack of colonial
expropriation, and centralized administration impeding ethnical fragmentation all concurred
to putting the country on a positive and sustainable path of economic development.
4.1.2 Botswana vis-A-vis the rest of the world
Botswana is engaged in regional cooperation mainly through the South African
Customs Union (SACU) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).
The Southern African Customs Union (SA CU), Africa's oldest customs union, was
created in 1910 as a direct consequence of the establishment of Union of South Africa; a
common external tariff (CET) for all former Boer states and British colonies was introduced.
22 As explained in the notes to Table 2 (Appendix 16), this is the most "conservative" among the three ratings
presented.
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The original Agreement, subsequently amended and upgraded in 1969 and 2002, involves
the following five countries: South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
Steps have been recently taken in order to reduce the excessive economic dominance
imposed by South Africa on the other four countries. While Lesotho, one of the world's
poorest countries, and Swaziland, whose economy is based on agriculture, are much weaker
in economic terms than their SACU neighbors, Botswana and Namibia present a much more
successful record of growth mainly boosted by their mineral resource endowments. As a
result, these last two countries, have progressively exercised a certain pressure to be
adequately represented in SACU decision-making process and not to be subdued to South
Africa's interests.
The 1969 SACU Agreement was characterized by three main aspects: the
introduction of a Revenue Sharing Formula (RSF) -based on each country's total imports and
directed at allocating the wealth accumulated in the Common Revenue Pool (CRP), the
inclusion of excise duties as a second source of funds to be re-distributed amongst the five
governments, and the 'two-year lag' separating the moment in which the payment was
disbursed to single governments and the moment in which data characterizing each country
were measured. Following its independence in 1966, Botswana opted in the SACU re-
distribution mechanism, in consideration of the high costs that the creation of a new
customs administration would have required. Thanks to the introduction of the new RSF
formula in 1969 Botswana's revenues from custom duties sharply increased from ZAR 1.4M
in 1968 to ZAR 5.14M in 1969/1970, and, due to the country's strong negotiating position,
it has been sustained at fairly high levels thereafter. If Botswana had historically been
dependent on British transfers to sustain its public revenues, it might now be developing a
similar dependence on SACU transfers.
In 1976, Botswana's government decided to leave the Rand Monetary Area (RMA)
to introduce its own currency, the Pula, while still preserving its membership in the SACU.
The initial regime pegged the Pula to the US dollar at a rate of P1 = US$ 1.15 (given that the
same peg was in place for South Africa, an essential parity between Pula and Rand was
initially assured) and it was then modified several times before settling on the current
arrangement; introduced in 2005, it stipulates for a crawling band mechanism whose rate of
crawl is determined by computing the differential between the Bank of Botswana's inflation
objective and forecasted inflation in trading partners.
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The new 2002 Agreement, apart from introducing institutional changes and at least a
dejure equality amongst the five SACU members, presented fairly different rules with respect
to the previous Treaty. First of all, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland (BNLS) are
permitted to protect infant industries (i.e. existing in the country for less than eight years,
they can be protected for up to eight years) by imposing duties on imports from South
Africa, as long as the same duties are imposed on imports from the rest of the world; South
Africa, the richest and most advanced SACU member, does not benefit from this infant
industry protection clause. Secondly, countries are now allowed to protect their farmers by
establishing marketing regulations on agricultural products, subject to the condition that
these regulations do not restrict free trade within the SACU area. Last but not least, the RSF
definition has been modified with respect to the past and is now defined by three separate
components. Customs Revenues are allocated on the basis of each country's share of intra-
SACU imports, thereby stimulating a trade diversion within the Union and compensating for
the phenomenon of structural polarization. The 85% of Excise Revenues is now distributed
according to each country's share of the total SACU GDP. The remaining 15%, so-called
Development Component, is allocated in inverse proportion to the GDP per capita of each
member state, thereby favoring the poorest countries. Given the lack of assurance that this
last component will be effectively invested on development projects, a clause should be
included in the SACU Agreement to provide for the great majority of this amount to be
spent on useful and productive projects, and of course demanding relevant proof of this
allocation. It was established in 2002 that South Africa would have kept managing the re-
distribution mechanism and the Common Revenue Pool for two years after the new
agreement was in place, and that a more transparent and democratic mechanism would have
been implemented thereafter.
This new agreement has the strong potential to expand the so-called entrepat trade,
defined by single countries' increase in national purchases of commodities from abroad and
their internal redistribution to other SACU members; unit cost of imports per member state
should therefore be reduced. Also, administrative costs involved in border inspections and
additional controls on merchandise entering or leaving the country have been eliminated.
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Effective and Nominal SACU duties for Botswana
Rate
Nominal Average SACU Tariff (2009) 8.1%
Trade Weighted Average (2008) 7.5%
Estimated Effective Rate of Customs Duties-Botswana (2009)23 1.
Source: GRYNBERG, R., MOTSWAPONG, M., 2012. SACU Revenue Sharing Formula. Towards a Development
Agreement. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) Working Paper 32. p. 20.
As shown by the table above, if Botswana had to renounce to its share of SACU
revenues, it would need to impose a new tariff significantly higher than the trade weighted
average in order for this change of regime to have a neutral impact on Revenues; on the top
of that, the imposition of a tariff on goods imported from South Africa would certainly
provoke the country's exit from the SADC. Looking at the future, Botswana and Namibia
would be able, thanks to their superior economic stance with respect to Lesotho and
Swaziland, to phase out any immediate loss of SACU Revenues suffered in the short-term in
order to implement long-lasting changes in their Trade policy and exit from the Union; as
long as the diamonds market will not be contemporaneously be disrupted by negative
shocks, these countries' fiscal adjustments are deemed to be sufficient to put them on the
right track for the future.
According to the SACU mission statement, the objective of this Customs Union is
"to serve as a building block of an ever closer community among the peoples of Southern
Africa." 24 At the present time, it is however not totally clear if this arrangement is beneficial
to the single countries and constitutes a positive basis for the future creation of a more EU-
like Union.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), initially created in 1980 as a
development coordinating conference, was converted into a proper community in 1992. The
mission statement of this inter-governmental organization "to promote sustainable and
equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient, productive
systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and
23 Calculated as the estimated customs revenue divided by total imports. In addition, estimated customs duties
are computed by applying ratios of customs to total SACU transfers for each country.
2 4 Source: GRYNBERG, R., MOTSWAPONG, M., 2012. SACU Revenue Sharing Formu/a: Towards a Development
Agreement. Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis Working Paper 32. p. 23.
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security; so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international
relations and the world economy."2s SADC is composed by fifteen member states, including
all five SACU countries. In this respect, if SACU was dismantled, SADC would be the most
likely candidate to assume its functions; however, the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA),
established in 2008, does not provide for strong enforcement mechanisms, being instead
based on a soft law apparatus. It is also clear that in the case of a SACU break-up, the BNLS
would need to either increase tariffs on imports from South Africa and other trade partners,
or significantly raise domestic taxes. If the first measure would increase the probability of a
regional war erupting in Southern Africa, both initiatives would generate a decline in
economic growth of the BLNS, thereby reducing those same revenues that they are
supposed to raise. According to the above-mentioned logic, this hypothetical substitution of
SADC for SACU is certainly not an optimal solution at least in the short-term.
Botswana's positive relations with the United States are confirmed by the statement
from the US Department of State: "The United States considers Botswana an excellent
partner and an advocate of and model for stability in Africa.",2 According to the African
Growth and Opportunity Act, Botswana benefits from a preferential treatment from the US
on trade matters. In addition to it, the Trade, Investment, and Development Cooperative
Agreement (TIDCA) signed between the SACU and the US, "establishes a forum for
consultative discussions, cooperative work, and possible agreements on a wide range of trade
issues, with a special focus on customs and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and trade and investment promotion."27
The European Union (EU) is also a relevant trade partner for Botswana. An interim
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) has been signed between the EU and Botswana,
Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique in 2009, while Namibia's signature is still pending. A
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and South Africa is
currently in force, and most SACU members have aligned their trade practices to this
25 Southern African Development Community (2013). SADC Mission. [online] Available at:
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-mission/
26 U.S. Department of State (2013). U.S. Reations With Botswana. [online] Available at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm
27 U.S. Department of State (2013). U.S. Re/ations With Botswana. [online] Available at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm
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agreement; according to the originally established and still unequal policy, custom duties are
collected by South Africa and then redistributed to the other four SACU members.
The Interim EPA provides for the elimination of all duties and quotas on imports
and exports from the above-mentioned Southern African countries to the EU. In the same
spirit as the SACU infant industry protection clause, the participating African countries are
allowed to re-introduce duties or quotas in the case they need to safeguard local economies.
Negotiations on a comprehensive EPA involving the whole Southern African region are still
pending, mainly because of the significant diversity in economic and institutional terms
within the region, and because of the EU insistence on including a Most Favord Nation clause
(ensuring that the EU will receive the as beneficial treatment in trade matters as the one
granted to the nation which receives the most favorable terms in respect of trade matters) in
future agreement. In spite of these hurdles, the presence of a solid agreement with South
Africa currently guarantees a fruitful and positive relationship between SACU members and
the EU; this is however just an anticipation of a future Southern Africa EPA.
4.2 Lquatorial Guinea: a country afflicted by a massive democratic deficit
4.2.1 Appraising the poor quality of domestic institutions
Equatorial Guinea presents a totally different case with respect to Botswana's. The
current record of corruption and political instability is not really the consequence of its
colonial past, but of pre-existent extractive institutions, ethnic division and internal conflict;
the most salient aspects of it have already been mentioned in paragraph 1.2.
The country's political standards are the lowest in the sample of CEMAC countries,
as shown by the Polity IV scores of 0 and -5 on respectively Democray and Polity; the
country's executive is recruited in an unregulated fashion and is very weakly constrained. The
dominance of the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea on the political scene is confirmed
by an all-time low score of 2 on the measure of Political Competition. It is evident that the
country lacks a system of checks and balances to rationalize its governmental and
administrative apparatus; President Nguema effectively assumes the role of Deus Ex Machina,
managing the country and its resources in line with a short-termist approach uniquely
directed at incrementing his personal wealth. Equatorial Guinea underperforms with respect
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to CEMAC regional standards and, according to the Polity IV scores, is comparable to the
equally undemocratic Republic of Congo.
As in the case of Botswana, the Doing Business indicators provide a proxy for the
quality of economic institutions in Equatorial Guinea. At a first glance, we notice that all
CEMAC countries are listed at the very bottom of the ranking occupying positions ranging
from the 161* (Cameroon) to the 183* (Republic of the Congo); Equatorial Guinea,
however, performs relatively well in comparison to its peers providing the second best score
of 162 on the condensed Ease of Doing Business measure. Accordingly, its performance on the
parameters of Getting Electriciy, Registering Propery, and Trading Across Borders is satisfactory
according to regional standards, and in particular Equatorial Guinea ranks 61" globally on
the measure of Enforcing Contracts, an even better result than the one characterizing Botswana;
the growth of the oil industry in the country has produced at least a mild progress in some
components of development. However, the country should render more efficient its
procedures to start a business and resolve insolvency, measures on which it underperforms its
regional peers.
As all but two countries belonging to the CEMAC regional agreement, Equatorial
Guinea is "not rated" by neither Standard & Poor's nor Moody's. Nevertheless, the country's
unstable political conditions, corrupt regime, and extractive institutions suggest that any
public debt issued by the country's would be considered as junk (i.e below S&P BBB rating).
Despite the unavailability of the Gini measure for Equatorial Guinea, other CEMAC
countries' values of this coefficient are never below 4028, considered by the UN as being the
threshold for an acceptable level of inequality. According to African standards in general and
regional tendencies in particular, and to the corrupt habits of its government, it is very likely
that Equatorial Guinea' income distribution is highly unequal and aligned to the CEMAC
trend.
Finally, the country is listed in the middle of the Global Peace Index, ranking at the 87*
position and providing for the second-best score in CEMAC after Gabon. Nonetheless, this
2 8 For the purpose of this analysis, the two values of 38.91 and 30.78 for Cameroon and Chad can be rounded
to 40.
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index could be fairly volatile depending on the eruption of a civil war in the country; if it has
been more or less under control until now, it is not at all to be excluded that, mostly after the
attempted coup in 2004, the country's peace record will worsen in the future; until a
democratic government and pluralistic political system will be installed, this risk will always
persist in Equatorial Guinea.
4.2.2 The involverent of Equatorial Guinea in regional and international agreements
The most prominent regional agreement Equatorial Guinea is part of is the
Communauti Economique et Monetaire des Etats de fAfique Centrale (CEMVIAC), established on
March the 16f" 1994 and including the following six countries: Cameroon, Republic of
Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic, and Chad. Characterized by
the Mission Statement objective to "promote an harmonious development of the member
states via the creation of a comprehensive and solid common market,"29 the CEMAC is
defined by a much more complex and integrated institutional structure than SACU including
a Parliament, a Court of Justice and a Court of Accounts. This stronger cooperation is
alimented by the fact that these six countries shared a common colonizer, France, and now
have a common currency, the CFA Franc (different but exchangeable at the 1-to-1 parity
with the West African Franc adopted by the other Francophone region in Western Africa).
The CEMAC, as a result, resembles more to the EU than to the SACU, in that its free trade
area is enhanced by the common currency. Both the CFA Franc and the West African Franc
were pegged to the French Franc until 1999, and then to the Euro according to the
following parity formula: 100 CFA Francs = 1 French Franc = f 0.152449.
In spite of Equatorial Guinea's Spanish and Portuguese colonial past, the country
joined the CEMAC, adopting French along with Spanish as administrative languages and the
CFA franc as national currency. This decision was mainly driven by economic and trade-
related motives, since Equatorial Guinea is a very small country sharing borders with
Cameroon and Gabon, two significantly larger countries and former French colonies; any
other arrangement would have been detrimental to the Equatoguinean effective economic
development.
29 Communaut6 Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (2013) CEMAC en bref [online] Available at:
http://www.cemac.int/presentationCEMAC.htm
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The Equatoguinean membership in the CEMAC ensures a somewhat stable
monetary policy for the small country as well as the support from the other five members;
this, however, does not rule out the possibility of an internal conflict to counter the
corrupted political system, an occurrence that would put at risk Equatoguinean future
participation to the Union.
Equatorial Guinea's relationship with the United States started in 1968 when the
country became independent from Spain. Much differently from the pronouncement by the
US Department of State with respect to Botswana, the one referred to Equatorial Guinea
reports: "Three major U.S. foreign policy issues form the cornerstone of the bilateral
relationship with Equatorial Guinea -- good governance and democracy; the protection of
human rights; and U.S. national security, especially access to energy resources." 30 Otherwise,
the US connection to the African country is dominated by trade in oil products, which
obviously constitute the main source of exports from Equatorial Guinea to the United
States; also, US oil companies are among the main investors in the country, holding a leading
role in explorative and extractive activities. In terms of humanitarian assistance, the US
Agency for International Development is involved in some regional projects in Equatorial
Guinea, but it currently has no office based in the country, thereby limiting the effectiveness
of the implemented measures.
Trade relationship between the European Union and Central Africa, defined as the
CEMAC countries plus the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sio Tome & Principe,
are dominated in primis by petroleum products, and in secundis by wood, cocoa, copper, and
bananas. In spite of the lack of a comprehensive EPA agreement between EU and Central
Africa, an Interim EPA has been signed in 2009 by Cameroon, one of the major CEMAC
countries, and it provides for a gradual elimination of duties and quotas in the 2010-2015
period on up to 80% of all EU exports to Cameroon. The agreement also encompasses EU
support in trade matters, institutional issues, and dispute settlement. Gabon and the
Republic of Congo are subject to the GeneraliZed Scheme of Preferences, a conditional exemption
from the WTO Most Favored Nation principle, and are not tied to the EU by any trade
30 U.S. Department of State (2013) U.S. Relations With Equatorial Guinea. [online] Available at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/7221.htm
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agreement; this will pose a problematic issue for Gabon that, now considered as an upper-
middle income country according to the World Bank definition, will not be anymore eligible
to the preferential treatment starting from the 1St of January 2014. The remaining Central
African countries, including Equatorial Guinea, fit the definition of Least Developed
Nations and are currently subject to the Everything but Arms scheme providing for a
preferential duty and quota-free EU access. As a result, the issue of stipulating a new EPA is
less impending for this last group of countries than for the more developed Gabon.
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5. A BB-NN analysis of positive investment dynamics
In this section I will adopt the BB-NN (Salter-Swan) model to briefly describe the
economic effect of an increase in foreign investment in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
generated by the discovery of natural resources.
A graphical representation of the BB-NN model is provided in Appendix 8.17. The
horizontal axis represents the aggregate demand (Y=C+I+G+NX") and the vertical axis
measures the country's competitiveness, identified by the real exchange rate (e/w-noninal
exchange rate/nominal wage level). The three lines reflect three different equilibria in the
economy:
- The BB line illustrates a situation of external balance, when the Balance of Payments 2
(BOP) is zero and the economy is in equilibrium with the rest of the world; a country
located above the BB line is running a BOP surplus with a positive change in reserves,
while the vice versa is valid for a country positioned below the BB line.
- The NN line reflects a situation of internal balance, involving equilibria both in domestic
economy and labor market; the economy is at "full employment", unemployment is at its
"natural rate" and inflation is at a sustainable level. The country is therefore close to the
frontier of optimal potential growth, and wages are not subject to increasing or
decreasing pressures. A country characterized by a high level of unemployment and a
low inflation is located below the NN line producing output below potential; an
economy presenting low unemployment and high inflation is above the NN line: output
is above potential and the economy is "overheating".
- The P line, also called the social peace line, represents a situation in which the
population's standard of living is sufficient enough to guarantee the social peace. Above
the line is depicted a situation in which wages are too low and social unrest is more likely
to happen; the contrary is valid for the area below the P line.
31 In a paraphrased form, National Output = Consumption + Investment + Government Spending + Net
Exports
32 BOP-current account + financial account = A Reserves
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The area of Graph 1 (Appendix 17) is therefore subdivided in six triangles, each representing
a different economic situation and characterized by different market conditions.
Both Equatorial Guinea and Botswana benefited from an increase in foreign
investment attracted by their respective wealth in terms of oil and diamonds. The related
economic dynamics are mapped in Graph 2 (Appendix 17). First of all, both Equatorial
Guinea and Botswana are not restricted to being positioned exactly on the BB line, a
condition that is instead mandated in the case of fully flexible exchange rate, and lack of
intervention in currency markets preventing changes in Reserves. On the contrary,
Equatorial Guinea is characterized by a system of pegged exchange rate (i.e. CFA Franc is
pegged to the Euro), and Botswana presents an intermediate regime of exchange rate (i.e.
crawling peg against a basket of international and regional currencies). In Graph 2 (Appendix
17), we notice that the investors' optimism regarding the two African economies' prospects
of growth drove a significant increase of foreign investments in both countries. Ceteris
paribus, the BB line moves down to BB' and the economy is now characterized by a greater
level of national output. Over time, the population gets used to these higher standards of
living and the P line will therefore shift down to P'. At the new point the population
gradually becomes accustomed to a higher wage level and living conditions, making it
extremely difficult for the government to reverse the situation through for instance an
imposed wage reduction. The country has now achieved a new and better equilibrium, which
on the BB-NN graph is located to the right of the initial point.
Two specifications are opportune at this point. Despite in Appendix 8.17 the new
equilibrium is represented at the intersection between BB', P' and NN there is no element
confirming that this perfect economic stabilization will happen in practice; it might well be
that the two lines will not intersect with the NN line after the shocks. If that was the case,
the government should implement specific fiscal and monetary policies in order to achieve a
new equilibrium. However, given that a deeper analysis of the BB-NN model is above of the
scope of this paper, only the simplest case has been portrayed in this section.
A second critique that could be addressed to the above-presented model hinges on
the inherent institutional and political differences existing between the two countries, an
element that would certainly affect the validity of their comparison. In the BB-NN model,
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this discrepancy would be well represented as a different shock to the P line. While
Botswana certainly qualifies for the definition of "socially peaceful", Equatorial Guinea, with
its corrupt government and extractive institutions, does not fulfill those criteria. As a result,
it is very likely that the P line characterizing Botswana will shift down significantly more than
the one characterizing Equatorial Guinea, because of the much greater standards of living
presented by the former country. Emphasizing this point, it might well be that the P line for
Equatorial Guinea does not shift at all, because of the greatly unequal distribution of income
within the country; the fact that standards of living for the President and his entourage have
increased does not mean that the ones of the population have. Again, being a deeper analysis
on this topic above the scope of this paper, discretion is left to the reader to investigate
further these BB-NN dynamics.
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6. A Game Theory model on the benefits of Public-Private
Partnerships
6.1 Introduction to Public-Private Partnerships
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Publc-Private Partnerships (PPP) can be defined as "a long-term agreement between
the government and a private partner where the service delivery objectives of the
government are aligned with the profit objectives of the private partner""; the success of
PPPs is exactly based on the appropriate transfer of risk between the public party and the
private one. Bovaird (2004) defines PPPs as "working arrangements based on a mutual
commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector
organization with any organization outside of the public sector."34 The role of the Private
Party is commonly undertaken by a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a consortium of
companies created to conduct a specific public project. The main advantages of PPPs are
thus identified in such synergies as collaboration, learning, and trust.
The effectiveness of a PPP is highly dependent on a correct assessment of the
project's value for money, which should include both quantitative and qualitative elements of
judgment and should be subject to specific and transparent guidelines enhancing the quality
of the final evaluation. In particular, the computation of the value for money is usually
conducted through the so-called "Public Sector Comparator", a system comparing the net
present cost of all bids related to the PPP project vis-a-vis what is considered to be the most
efficient traditional procurement method for the allocation of a public sector project. In this
respect, the adoption of advanced technologies facilitates the attainment of a positive
equilibrium between public and private parties.
The Public Sector Comparator also takes into account the extent to which the risks
underlying the project are appropriately shared between public and private parties. From a
33 OECD, 2011. From Lessons to Princples for the Use of Pub/ic-Private Partnershps. Public Governance and
Territorial Development Public Management Committee. 32nd Annual Meeting of Working Party Of Senior
Budget Officials 6-7 June 2011, Luxembourg [Hand-Out]. p. 3. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/48144872.pdf
34 Bovaird, T. (2004). Public-private partnerships: From contested concepts to prevalent practice. International
Review ofAdministrative Sciences, 70(2), p.200.
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purely economic perspective, risks should be carried by the party that is more apt at bearing
them, either in preventing their realization (ex-ante risk management) or in dealing with the
results of a materialized risk (ex-post risk management). A second classification might be
useful to characterize the risks attached to a project: performance-related risks, financial
risks, time and cost overrun risks, and other construction risks. The ability for a party to
manage the risk is measured both in terms of its competences and on the basis of the costs
incurred in managing it. In addition, since the perception of risks proper to a project usually
differs among stakeholders, an appropriate strategy of multi-party risk communication
should be carefully implemented.
The government should also rigorously establish the affordability of the PPP project,
by evaluating if the public expenditure associated to it is sustainable and in line with the
intertemporal budget constraint. According to an "opportunity-cost logic", a project is
affordable if its delivery through the PPP improves the value for money with respect to its
completion via a traditional public procurement mechanism.
In addition to all the beneficial aspects usually characterizing these arrangements, the
adoption of PPPs generally reduces spending flexibility, and potentially allocative efficiency,
on the part of the government. In fact, in compliance with general rules related to national
accounting, the government generally records in the initial period a level of public
expenditure which is not at all commensurate to the significant investment outlay; given the
necessary payment of an annual fee, future public expenditures will necessarily increase, thus
limiting the scope of undertaking new investments in other areas. In order to counter this
misrepresentation, the public sector should implement sound and transparent accounting
procedures in the treatment of PPP activities; these would constitute a guarantee that a PPP
arrangement will not be selected just because of its advantages from an accounting
standpoint.
According to the OECD, PPP governance should be conducted in line with ten
principles", internally divided in two areas of implementation: the Political and Institutional
framework characterizing the country (principles from I to 3), and the Approval and Management
procedure governing the PPP (principles from 4 to 10). It is very useful to consider these
3 5 The specific wording of the principles has been taken by the one presented on the OECD paper From Lessons
to Prinaplesfor the Use of Public-Private Partnerships in order to ensure consistency.
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guidelines to capture the essence of PPP measures' success. A brief representation of these
ten principles follows 6 :
1. The political leadership should ensure public awareness of the relative costs, benefits and
risks of PPPs and conventional procurement.
2. Set up a clear, predictable and well-regulated legal framework for PPPs.
3. Ensure that the necessary institutional roles and capacities are present and active in the
public sector.
In particular, four main roles should be independently covered in the public sector:
ensuring the pursuit of the overall fiscal policy goals, carefully evaluating the project's
value for money, implementing operationally the PPP project, and conducting a proper
audit of the PPP results. A proper separation of the entities in charge of these positions
is deemed necessary so as to avoid confusion and to ensure proper accountability. The
agencies usually entrusted with the four above-mentioned roles are: the country's Central
Budget Authority, the Public-Private Partnership unit specifically dedicated to the
project, the Public Authority formally procuring the PPP, and the Supreme Audit
Institution in the country.
4. The decision to invest should be based on the government thorough evaluation while
being separate from the specific financing method related to the project.
5. The project should be affordable and transparently treated in the budget process -
regardless of the level of government it applies to.
6. Carefully investigate which investment method yields most value for money.
7. Transfer the risks to those that manage them best.
A significant and extensive communication and the development of trust should be
fostered within the group of stakeholders in order to ensure the convergence of risk
assessment criteria.
8. Involve the user in the design and monitoring of PPP to increase value for money.
The significance of this principle derives from the alignment of the service quality
needed by the end users and created by the service provider; this party will be compelled
to minimize the discrepancy between quality offered and quality demanded.
36 OECD, 2011. From Lessons to Prinapes for the Use of Public-Private Partnerships. Public Governance and
Territorial Development Public Management Committee. 32nd Annual Meeting of Working Party Of Senior
Budget Officials 6-7 June 2011, Luxembourg [Hand-Out]. pp. 9-13. Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/48144872.pdf
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9. Maintain value for money during operation, renegotiation and project failure.
10. Ensure competition and integrity in the procurement process.
In economic terms, competition often creates a greater service quality in that any
competitor is persuaded to maximize its performance (according to its specific
objectives) so as to win the majority of demand; on the contrary, a monopoly will more
likely provide the service in a less efficient manner, being the monopolist already aware
that it will grab the whole demand; this conclusion is even more dramatic if the
monopoly is natural one and therefore mandated and regulated by the government. The
same reasoning is valid for PPP procurement; by ensuring that competition exists both
for and in the market, the government boosts quality and efficiency in service provision.
The majority of the problems impeding a successful PPP implementation are related to
bad administration policies. The adoption of an opportunistic bidding behavior during the
procurement phase is prompted by the asymmetry of information between the government
and the private parties involved. The bidders may have an incentive to either understate the
risks attached to the project, or overstate the value of the project and its return; since the
government is usually unable to verify the validity of the company's assertions due to the
lack of information on its technical processes, it is likely that the public party will either
wrongly choose PPP as the most appropriate mechanism, or that it will not choose the most
efficient company or consortium to implement the project.
A second weakness of common PPP implementation, also related to a form of
opportunistic behavior, can be defined as a moral hazard problem arising between the
government and the company/consortium. A possible application is based on contract
renewal. If the company expects the contract to be renewed in the future it will have the
incentive to perform in a less efficient manner so as to maximize its current payoff; this
short-termism will have a negative effect on the successful attainment of the PPP objectives.
A potential cost for the company will be incurred in terms of reputational damage if their
inappropriate conduct is discovered.
Negotiation between parties is a key determinant of a well-constructed PPP initiative,
and the involvement of an International Organization as a mediator could be very beneficial
in this respect. The achievement of a win-win solution and total benefits from negotiation is
ensured if the value attached to cooperation by all parties is greater than the value that could
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be realized by independently pursuing the "best alternative to a negotiated agreement".
However, different parties often have asymmetric interpretations of the "need" to be
satisfied by the accord. To circumvent this complication, risks should be appropriately
shared and a threshold should be established for the "added value" so as to allow each party
to autonomously decide if to enter the deal or not. In this regard, the creation of a shared
and mutually understood set of objectives would facilitate the achievement of a successful
deal. The proper value definition is generally achieved through the interaction between three
parties: the private part (i.e. company), the public sector (i.e. government), and the citizens.
The will of the public sector and the one of the citizens is merged to define the public value;
this condition, while valid in most developed countries characterized by a sufficient level of
institutional quality and democracy, is not at all verified in corrupted developing countries
(e.g. Equatorial Guinea) where the leaders' rent-seeking objectives strikingly differ with
respect to the population's ones. This is exactly the reason why International Organizations
should be involved in PPPs performed in developing countries; these organizations
guarantee that the government will act in the interest of the citizens despite the context of
democratic deficit. Unfortunately, however, the main hurdle to a complete success of a PPP
in a corrupt country still is identified in a lack of fair and equitable redistribution of the
public good to society.
6.1.1 The advent of Public-Private Partnerships and related best practices
The adoption of PPP for the provision of public services has increased in the 1990's
and particularly in the 2000's. For the most part of the 2000-2010 decade PPPs in UK
represented the 12% of the country's total annual capital expenditure. In addition to it, other
countries as France, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Korea, and South Africa are
progressively increasing their use of PPPs. According to a survey conducted by Public
Works Financing (PWF) and covering the years 1985-2009 the three main PPP projects
involve Road construction, Rail, and Water. Also, an analysis conducted on twenty OECD
countries revealed that their percentage of public sector infrastructure taking place through
PPPs is between 0% and 5% for nine countries, between 5% and 15% for other nine
countries and an above 20% for the outliers of Chile and Mexico.
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A very successful example of PPP project is the Chad-Cameroon petroleum
development and pipeline project, initiated in 1993 and considered still in 2005 to be the
most significant energy infrastructure development project in Sub-Saharan Africa. A brief
analysis of this project is useful for a proper understanding of the benefits characterizing
PPPs and of the obstacles to be surmounted for their successful implementation.
The project was owned and operated by a consortium of companies in the form of a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), already presented in section 6.1 above as the most common PPP
arrangement. The SPV was composed of: Exxon Mobil (operator of the project, and owing
40% of the equity), Chevron (owning 25% of the equity), and Petronas (owning 35% of the
equity); they together invested $3bn in the project. The companies benefited from an
extended exploration permit until at least the year 2004; they also received the 55% of the
total returns from the petroleum deposits in the Doba basin, while the government of Chad
and Cameroon received respectively the 36% and 9%. In addition to the governments of
Chad and Cameroon, the other party involved in this PPP project was the World Bank. As
highlighted above, the involvement of International Organizations ([Os) and Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) is sometimes essential to ensure the credibility of
governments in developing countries and to cover the risk of a possible defection by the
public entity. In this specific occurrence, the World Bank not only contributed in terms of
structural and strategic support to the governments of Chad and Cameroon, but it also
extended a total value of US$193 million in loans.
The World Bank was particularly influential in establishing an oil revenue-
management plan for the government of Chad. Oil revenues were categorized in Direct
Revenues, including dividends and royalties, and Indirect Revenues, composed of taxes, fees, and
customs duties. The 90% of the former income category was paid in a treasury account
hosted at two local banks, while the 10% was retained in a savings account opened in an
international financial institution and specifically directed at benefiting future generations.
The totality of the indirect revenues was deposited in a public treasury account. A crucial
aspect of the arrangement provided for all direct revenues to be allocated in line with the
main goal of reducing poverty and on the basis of this sharing formula: 80% for the
coverage of priority sector expenses (e.g. public health, rural development, education,
environment and water resources management), 15% to cover the operating and investment
costs of the country, and the remaining 5% to specifically address the expenses of
decentralized communities. In sum, the World Bank revenue management plan was directed
not only at addressing the impending needs of the government in terms of development-
related expenditures, but it also included an essential forward-looking element addressing the
needs of future generations. The near majority of the expenditures, both of a short-term and
long-term nature, were characterized by their beneficial impact on society.
With the development of oil fields and pipelines came the infrastructural advances
involving the construction and improvement of roads, bridges, rail system, and airstrips. In
this respect, the consortium differentiated itself from previous examples of PPP; by not
limiting their monitoring activities to the common Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA), they also performed a Health Impact Assessment (HIA) to predict the PPP project's
effects on human health; a proper coordination with policymakers was then needed to
prevent or mitigate the realization of the assessed negative impacts.
The direct benefit to society accrued not only via the public programs supported by
the World Bank revenue-management plan, but also via corporate channels directed at
improving health and employment conditions in the country. An extensive malaria control
program and similar initiatives directed at compensating for the lack of clean water, poor
hygiene and nutrition, and low vaccination records were accomplished during the period of
the PPP operations and were maintained thereafter. Significantly enough, these programs
were extended not only to the project's employees but also to the whole community living in
adjacent villages. In terms of their impact on the consortium's operations, these programs
increased the average number of workdays per worker along with their working
effectiveness, thus generating considerable savings for the private party. The involvement of
the population via the promotion of community gatherings for the discussion of health
programs and similar measures created a positive externality by increasing the public's
participation in the political process; it thus fostered the implementation of the rule of law
and good governance in those communities.
This particularly positive example of the Chad-Cameroon oil project highlights the
beneficial impact that PPP can have on society, even in countries that are not characterized
by a particularly high quality of institutions. In spite of the weak development of PPPs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, this example presents the strong potential entailed in these cooperative
arrangements and conditional on a sufficient level of political will. The strong commitment
of the private parties involved and the presence of an International Organization like the
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World Bank or the International Monetary Fund are two catalysts of the successful
implementation of a PPP initiative.
A second example of positive PPP execution is represented by the case of Liberia, a
country characterized by a rich natural resource endowment of rubber, iron ore, and timber.
The focus of this section will be on some legal requirements that, is implemented, have the
potential to increase the likelihood of a positive PPP realization. In concomitance with the
creation of a new Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) to accelerate its achievement of
"middle-income status", Liberia has recently started to leverage its resource concessions and
to implement PPPs directed at fostering job creation. The majority of the concessions
already approved by the government include a local content clause, mandating a lower threshold
in terms of local procurement of goods and services to be observed by the private party, and
an employment clause requiring all unskilled workers to be Liberian. Since the private party is
supposed progressively develop the employees' skills, the government requires a specific
share of those companies' subsidiaries to be owned by Liberia and a percentage of the
management to be Liberian in a pre-defined number of years. According to a similar clause,
the private party commits to consistently train the local workers and to improve their skills.
These clauses have successfully formalized a series of principles that are now implied in the
country's PPP framework in line with the mutual understanding of the parties involved. As a
final note, by creating a solid legal structure underlying these agreements Liberia has
maximized the PPP-related value for the government and its population.
These examples of successful PPPs provide several elements that should encourage
other governments to improve their relationship with the private sector. It is with this
principle in mind, that the focus is now shifted to analyzing the main characteristics of the
natural resource markets in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea.
6.2 Botswana: how diamond sector's idiosyncrasies affect PPP applicability
The diamond industry is controlled by a handful of companies including De Beers,
Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, and Trans Hex; as a group, they hold a cartel-like power and
control the global supply of gem-grade rough diamonds to preserve price stability. The
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Diamond Trading Company (DTC) is in charge of all De Beers distribution activities; it
collects rough diamonds from all over the world, sorts them, and resells them to
"Sightholders"37 , who then take care of all other value-adding activities (e.g. dealing and
preparing rough diamonds, designing and manufacturing jewelry). Traditionally established
in London, the DTC will be definitely relocated in Gaborone at the end of 2013. The
significance of this decision for Botswana is based not only on the FDI inflows but also on
the now improved chances to avoid the resource curse; thanks to this rearrangement,
Botswana will always represent the hub for the commerce of rough diamonds, even once its
diamond' reserves will be fully depleted.
The Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics hosted a Conference
with Botswana's President Festus Mogae in 2006. A very interesting record of Botswana's
diamond activities is found in the transcript gathered from the audio recording 8 .
As reiterated several times by the President, Botswana's developmental success has
been achieved by re-investing the proceeds from mineral activities in economic sectors as
education and health. The country is also a major initiator of those initiatives directed at
eliminating the trade in "conflict diamonds" (i.e. diamonds that have generated intra-national
conflicts among different groups determined to seize the resource), as the Kimberly Process
established in 2003. Thanks to the serious involvement of several diamond-producing
countries in this initiative, the trade in conflict diamonds had been reduced to less than 1%
of the global diamond trade. De Beers, on the corporate side, also started supporting the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) initiative in 2003.
The successful nature of the relationship between Botswana and De Beers provides
for one additional reason to relocate the DTC in Gaborone. In this respect, diamonds and
oil differ in their recovery period of the initial investment; being this period longer for
diamonds' exploitation and being the nature of the investment mainly fixed and
infrastructure-based, De Beers is particularly interested in nurturing a positive relation with
37 According to the De Beers definition, these are the DTC's clients. Because the DTC does not have enough
supply to meet demand, and does not require its purchasers to compete on price for reasons of commercial
stability, it must use objective criteria (see Supplier of Choice) in order to select its customers, who are known
as Sightholders. Source De Beers (2013) Diamond G/ossay. [online] Available at:
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/Diamonds/Diamond-Glossary/
38 MOGAE, F., 2006. Diamonds and Development The Botswana Story. [transcript prepared from audio recording],
Peter G. Peterson Conference Center Institute for International Economics. [online] Available at:
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/events/10.1 1.06/PresidentMogael0.1 1.06.pdf
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Botswana. The achievement of this fruitful cooperation has also been facilitated by the stable
business and regulatory environment distinguishing this specific country from many others
in Africa. The current arrangement has been attained after several rounds of negotiations,
always characterized by a solid and determinate bargaining stance of the Botswana's
government. The main result has been the creation of Debswana, the diamond company
jointly owned by the country of Botswana and De Beers, each party owing a 50% share.
This section presents the framework that will define the implementation of PPPs in
Botswana. As mentioned above, the country's mineral resources are vested in the state"; in
particular, the government already owns 50% of Debswana and has the right to the 15% of
the equity of any new mining venture. In reference to the PPP game that will be presented in
section 6.4, Botswana's payoffs from any public-private cooperation in terms of diamonds'
exploitation are: dividends from profit redistribution (50% in the case of Debswana), royalty
(10% of gross market value or sale value), profit tax (corporate tax equal to 22% of the
realized profit), and withholding tax on remitted dividends (7.5% of all dividends paid by a
resident company to a resident or non-resident)40 . But the benefits accruing to the
government are not only monetary. In fact, De Beers' investment in Jwaneng, the richest
mine in the world by value whose operations started in 1982, has not been limited to mineral
extraction. On the contrary, the company invested in economic development by building the
Jwaneng Mine Hospital, the Jwaneng Airport, and the Acacia private primary school in the
area surrounding the mine. Other benefits accruing to society involve the creation of
employment opportunities; the 2011 Cut-8 project, extending Jwaneng's period of operation
until 2025, created 1,400 jobs on the top of the 3,100 employees already working at the
mine; the citizens of Botswana occupied the 86% of those newly created jobs. An additional
gain to society was produced in terms of indirect employment; as a form of local content clause,
the government stipulates that 51% of all external contracts signed as part of the Cut-8
project have to be allocated to citizens of Botswana. Finally, the relocation of DTC from
3 9 REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA, 1999. Mines and Mineral Act no. 17 of 1999. Supplement A- Government
Gazette dated 171h September, 1999, p. 121. Available at:
http://www.mines.gov.bw/mines%20and%20minerals%20%2OAct.pdf
4 0 DELOITTE, (2006). Investing in Africa -Botswana. Available at:
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/za-taxBotswana_280907(2).pdf
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London to Gaborone at the end of 2013 represents a game-changer in terms of
centralization of the resource's management.
Despite the pretty restrictive fiscal tools adopted by Botswana, the country's
institutional excellence relative to African standards and its development record have the
potential to encourage future negotiations of PPPs; in this respect, evidence is found in the
success of the "Debswana experiment," which could itself be defined as a PPP-like
cooperative agreement.
6.3 The rain elements of the Equatoguinea n market as a host of PPPs
The establishment of Equatoguinean oil operations in 1994 progressively crowded
out the production of coffee, cocoa and timber. The Zafiro field, discovered in 1995 and
operated by Exxon Mobil, is still currently the main producing field in Equatorial Guinea.
For the purposes of this paper, it can be considered as the counterpart of the Jwaneng mine
in Botswana. In 2002 the Equatoguinean government instituted GEPetrol, the national oil
company representing the State's interests in oil contracts and participating in partnerships
with private parties. In fact, this national company detains the 28.75% of the joint venture
operating the Zafiro field, the remaining 71.25% being owned by Mobil Equatorial Guinea,
Inc, a subsidiary of Exxon Mobil.
According to the Code of Hydrocarbures and as in the case of Botswana, the State is
the owner of all natural resources the country is endowed with". Art. 13 of this law
stipulates that oil operations rights are allocated to a particular company according to a
process of competitive bidding. In addition, Art. 32 establishes that the government will own
the facilities and infrastructures built on Equatoguinean soil once the contractor has
recovered its initial cost. In representation of the benefits accruing to society, Art. 87 of the
Code specifies that private contractors should satisfy domestic consumption requirements
according to a pre-determined formula; in terms of skills development and training, Art. 88
mandates the cooperation of the State and the Contractor in the construction and
maintenance of the "Hydrocarbon Technological Institute of Equatorial Guinea" and the
creation of training centers for Equatoguinean citizens working in the oil sector.
41 Hydrocarbons Law No. 8/2006 of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (2006). Available at:
http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/GuineeEq/GE%20-
%20Code%20hydrocarbures%202006_ENG.pdf
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The company Mobil Equatorial Guinea Inc. invested in some socially and
environmentally beneficial projects in Equatorial Guinea, as the Bioko Diversity Protection
Program directed at protecting the ecosystem in general and turtles in particular on the
Bioko island, the World Class Technical Training Program running from 1996 to 2007 and
valued at US$30m, and the StopAids program. The company has also invested in fostering
the education of young girls and in fighting the spread of malaria.
In terms of monetary benefits, the country has signed a double taxation treaty with
the other CEMAC member states. The oil production activities conducted by resident
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companies in Equatorial Guinea are subject to the following tax treatment: both business
income and capital gains are taxed at the Corporate Tax rate of 35%; dividends and capital
gains received by foreign shareholders are taxed at the 25% rate; a withholding tax of 6.25%
on resident companies and of 10% on non-resident ones is applied in the sector of oil and
gas; as to royalties, the Tax code establishes that the cost of patents, trademarks, and similar
rights are deductible conditional on their moderate size and on their actual adoption in the
business*3.
A Public-Private Partnership could be established as a joint venture between
GEPetrol and an oil company. Article 83 in Decree Law no. 8/2006 stipulates that the State
participation through GEPetrol into any oil and gas venture cannot be lower than 20%4;
this Law also increased the requirements in terms of the local content clause.
The situation in Equatorial Guinea is different with respect to the one characterizing
Botswana, increasing the country's vulnerability to the resource curse's realization for two
sets of reasons. Firstly, Botswana has committed to economic diversification by developing a
market for vehicles' assembly (significant enough to scare the neighbor South Africa), by
investing downstream in the diamond value chain to avoid being constrained in the
upstream rough diamonds extraction, and by negotiating the relocation of the DTC in
Gaborone; on the contrary, Equatorial Guinea's oil activity is merely focused on oil
42 In order to benefit from a preferential tax treatment, for instance, Exxon Mobil created a new entity to
operate in Equatorial Guinea: Mobil Equatorial Guinea, Inc., based in Houston (Texas).
4 3 DELOITTE, (2006). Investing in Africa - Equatorial Guinea. Available at:
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/za tax_- EquatorialGuinea_280907.pdf
44Hydrocarbons Law No. 8/2006 of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (2006), p. 18. Available at:
http://www.droit-afrique.com/images/textes/GuineeEq/GE% 20-
%2OCode%20hydrocarbures%202006_ENG.pdf
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extraction and no refinery is currently present in the country. The second set of reasons is
based on the inexistent quality of Equatoguinean institutions and its lack of democracy.
These conditions do not really encourage companies to cooperate and establish a positive
relationship with the Equatoguinean government; private parties, predominantly driven by a
profit-maximizing logic, would always distrust the public sector's focus on rent
expropriation. As a reminder, Equatorial Guinea has not yet succeeded in complying with
the EITI standards, thereby confirming the total lack of transparency in its oil operations.
While the establishment of PPP in Botswana would be much easier, the creation of a similar
cooperative agreement in Equatorial Guinea would require the participation of an IO or
NGO in order to enhance the credibility of the corrupt government's commitment.
6.4 Introduction to the Public-Private Partnership Game
This section will analyze the potential of PPPs to drive development according to the
Game Theory paradigm. As highlighted above, a fruitful collaboration between public and
private sectors could effectively support the economic diversification and the increase in
standards of living proper to a resource-rich country.
The initial focus will be on the description of all technicalities and assumptions
underlying the game. In the following analysis, a particular reference will be made to the
positive case of Botswana so as to identify positive elements that could be applied to the
context of Equatorial Guinea; as a specification, a the reader should "qualitatively" control
for the much worse institutional quality characterizing this latter country. In particular, the
payoffs will be represented first by letters, to ensure the model's general applicability, and
then by fictitious numbers, in order to represent the specific case of Botswana. Because of
the lack or incompleteness of reliable data concerning the companies' investments in the
analyzed countries, the figures displayed will uniquely serve the example; by no means,
however, this arrangement will hinder the validity of the analysis's results. As to the
magnitude of each letter (i.e. each payoff), it has been defined in relative terms with respect
to other letters (i.e. other payoffs) so as to satisfy the main assumptions of the game and
guarantee the validity of the results. With this premise, we shall now proceed with the game-
theoretic analysis, trusting that its representation of our sector of interest is consistent with
reality.
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The starting point of the game occurs right after the private party (e.g. the diamond
company in the case of Botswana, and the oil company in the case of Equatorial Guinea) has
invested in the extraction of the country's natural resource (e.g. diamonds for Botswana, oil
for Equatorial Guinea) and it has already established its operations in the country. A first
commitment by the company" has already been made, but for the moment it is uniquely
directed at generating rents from the natural resource sector dominating the country's
competitive advantage. The specific purpose of this study is to analyze the company's
incentive to contribute to the country's development by investing in sectors as Education or
Health, as well as the public sector's incentive to attract a similar type of investment that is
not centered on the exploitation of its natural resources.
The structure I am going to adopt is the one of a Repeated Game since the relationship
between public and private parties are characterized by repeated interactions and a
cooperation evolving over time; in the optic of creating and alimenting a long-lasting
relationship, both players might accept to suffer a cost or lower payoff in the short-term in
order to create and sustain a chain of positive payoffs over the long-term.
In conformity with the definition of Public-Private Partnership, the two players of
the game are the country's Public Sector and the Private Par*v, a single corporate entity or a
consortium that has already invested in the country's natural resource sector and is now
deciding whether to engage in socially beneficial projects fostering economic development.
The Government's4 strategies are defined by the specific treatment that is reserved
to the private party, in terms of taxes and working conditions. The choice is thus limited to
cooperate, when the government foregoes a higher tax/royalty rate and invests in the creation
of positive working conditions to encourage the company's engagement in developmental
projects, or not cooperate, when it is only interested in the private party's investment in the
natural resource sector and in expropriating the generated rents through the imposition of
restrictive fiscal and working conditions.
The Private party's strategies are either to invest in the country's development and
undertake projects directed at improving the standards of living of the population, or not
4 5 In this section 6.4, the word "Company" is always referred to the Private Party, a single entity or Special
Purpose Vehicle (consortium of entities), that has already invested in the country's natural resource sector and
is considering if to invest in its development; for the purposes of the game representation, these two terms are
used interchangeably.
46 In this section 6.4 concerning the representation of the Game, the word "Government" always identifies the
Government of the country in which the investment is made; it is also called Pub/c Sector in the game.
62
invest because either it does not plan to operate in the country over the long-term or because
it is discouraged by the lack of public sector's cooperation.
Two games will be presented in this paper: the first one is the Standard Repeated
Game described above, while the second one will include an additional cross-ownership
clause acting as a game-changer for both players' strategies. This second game will be
governed by fairly different dynamics, facilitating the attainment of cooperation with respect
to the standard case. The description of the games follows in the two sections below.
6.4.1 The Standard PPP ganw: a simple form of non-cooperation
As mentioned above, in the Standard Game public and private parties are different
and separate entities and cross-ownership is not part of the picture.
The description will now shift to both parties' payoffs, which are first identified by
letters and then by fictitious numbers in Appendix 8.18.
The Public Sector's payoff a involves all the benefits accrued to the country as a
consequence of the private party's investment in economic development; these includes:
- Improving standards of Education and Health and the infrastructures related to these
and other essential public services;
- Generating opportunities for both direct and indirect employment;
- Attracting additional investment in the country by enhancing investors' confidence
through the creation of a better investment climate;
- Fostering the creation of a more transparent administration and a greater institutional
quality by formalizing some of the underlying political mechanisms.
The cost c has the connotation of "opportunity cost": it includes the foregone marginal
increase in fiscal revenues in the forms of taxes and royalties and the additional investment
in the creation of positive working conditions that the government could have avoided by
persisting with the status quo and preserving its uncooperative attitude; both the lower fiscal
revenues and the expenditures in improving working conditions are considered in their
marginal terms.
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For what concerns the Private party, the positive payoff b is subdivided in two parts:
- br represents the benefits accruing to the company in terms of paying lower taxes and
royalties to the government and being able to operate under better working conditions;
- (b - bs) involves all those gains accumulated over time and are characterized by a more
long-term nuance, including:
- Attracting more companies and investment in the country by generating a better
investment climate via a positive feedback loop mechanism 7;
- Making its own presence in the country more sustainable and being less subject to
the government's expropriatory practices by both facilitating he delivery of basic
services (i.e. Health and Education) and improving the quality of institutions;
- Ensuring its future access to a well-trained workforce thanks to its initial investment
in human capital;
- Engendering a more "supportive" attitude by the public sector; according to this quid
pro quo-like context, the government is encouraged to cooperate because of the
company's clear commitment to fostering the country's development;
- Generating long-standing reputational benefits.
As a crucial specification, the long-term benefits resulting from the PPP implementation
do not accrue independently of future actions; on the contrary, they require continued
cooperation between the players and the creation of a shared trust between them.
The cost d incurred by the company includes the total investment in projects not directly
related to the natural resource sector (i.e. main driver of the company's presence in the
country) and alimenting the Public sector's benefit a.
The assumptions underlying the game are the following:
1. Both players' strategies are flexible and can be renewed periodically, thus allowing the
representation of a Repeated Game.
4 7 In this case positive network externalities will be generated. If the company involved in the game will jump-
start the creation of a positive investment climate, other companies and additional portfolio investment and
FDI will be attracted in the country and this will contribute to the creation of an even better investment
climate; this positive feedback loop is the source of the positive network externalities benefiting all the
companies in the industrial ecosystem.
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2. All payoffs and costs incurred are divisible; they are realized periodically and not in a
lump sum.
3. For the purposes of the game, a > bin that we assume that the benefits accruing to the
government, entailing significant advances in terms of development, exceed the gains
obtained by the company as a result of its involvement in the country's growth. For
instance, the construction of a hospital or school will greatly contribute to the
improvement in standards of living and create long-lasting benefits whose present value
could be computed by discounting future payoffs.
4. We also define d > c in that the costs incurred by the company to engage in projects
fostering the country's development are assumed to be greater than the marginal
foregone fiscal revenues and the marginal investment in improving working conditions
incurred by the public sector.
5. Also, a > d > c and b > d > c since the benefits accruing to both players are characterized
by both a tangible and intangible, and a long-term and short-term nature. They are so
assumed to exceed the periodic costs incurred by each player.
6. Very importantly: bsr = c. This assumption directly arises from the definition of this
bilateral interaction as a zero-sum game: what the government loses in marginal taxes
and spends in marginal investments in improving the country's working conditions is
exactly gained by the company in the short-term and is reflected in the value of bsr.
7. Finally, b - d > bsr since the several elements constituting the total benefits accruing to
the company net of the one-period investment ensure its greater magnitude with respect
to the simple short-term benefit.
As per the above assumptions, the game will be characterized by the chain of
inequalities: a > b > d >c = bsT.
The focus will now shift to describing the payoff Matrix 1 represented in Appendix 8.18;
a numerical representation of the game is also displayed in Matrix 2. In the upper left
quadrant, identified by the combination (Cooperate, Invest), the Public Sector and the Private
Party present respectively the payoffs a-c and b-d, always greater than zero by construction;
they are simply defined as the difference between the gain realized by the player and the loss
incurred in the form of marginal opportunity cost (for the government) and marginal
investment (for the company).
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The bottom-right quadrant of the matrix depicts the status quo, since neither party adopts
a cooperative attitude vis-A-vis the other, the company persists in exploiting the country's
resources and the government perpetuates its rents' expropriation. Despite both parties'
positive payoffs related to the exploitation of the resource, they both present a nullpayoff
with respect to the "social" game.
The upper-right quadrant represents a situation in which the Government adopts a
cooperative attitude vis-a-vis the company, while this one refuses to invest in the country's
development; the government's payoff, equal to -c, is exactly equal to the company's positive
bsr according to the zero-sum game logic underlying their interactions (Assumption 6).
Finally, the bottom-left quadrant displays the positive payoff of a for the Public sector
and -d for the Private party, the company has invested in the country's development creating
a benefit a for the counterparty, but the government has decided not to cooperate, thus
leaving the company with a negative payoff corresponding to the incurred investment -d.
The numeric Matrix 2 (Appendix 8.18) facilitates the identification of the equilibrium of
the game in period 1. The company does not have a dominant strategy; knowing that the
government cooperates, the company has the incentive to invest (1.5>1), and it has the
incentive not to invest otherwise (0>-2). On the contrary, the government does have a
dominant strategy: it always prefers not to cooperate irrespective of what the other player
does (4>3, and 0>-1). As a result, the equilibrium characterizing the Standard Game in
Period 1 is (Not cooperate, Not invest) represented by the payoffs (0, 0); the status quo is the
equilibrium solution for both players. Nonetheless, conditional on a consistent and shared
intention to create a positive and long-lasting relationship, the players could coordinate on a
better solution in which the government cooperates and the company invests, thereby inducing
the achievement of greater payoffs (3, 1.5) for both actors; this "coordination exercise" is
thus beneficial to both parties. The same conclusion is confirmed by the representation of
the Standard game in Period 2, which is the subject of the next section.
The analysis is now shifted to the Standard Game in Period 2. For the sake of clarity,
Period I and Period 2 are characterized by the same length, assumed to equal 3 years, a
period of time sufficiently long in order for both players to implement their strategies; the
results of the game are however not dependent on the specific definition of the time period.
Matrix 3 (Appendix 8.18) pictures the same game as the one represented in Period 1
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(consistently with the definition of a repeated game) assuming that both players converged
on the equilibrium (not cooperate, not invest) in Period 1. The approach used in the analysis is to
add to the payoffs in Period 2 the ones obtained by each player in Period 1, that in this case
are both equal to zero; as a result, the Standard Game in Period 2 will present exactly the
same payoffs as the ones proper to Period 1. The equilibrium is still defined by the status quo
and no cooperative dynamic is engendered between the two players. Hence, if the
uncooperative equilibrium is attained in Period 1, then players will always be attracted by the
same settlement in the following periods; this negative feedback loop locks both players in
an adverse equilibrium. It will be extremely difficult for any actor to exit this trap, because of
the path-dependent nature of this "trust game"; each party has observed the counterparty's
uncooperative behavior in the past; perceiving a high risk of this attitude to persist in the
future, both players will be discouraged from cooperating in the current period fearing to
suffer an immediate loss.
Matrix 4 (Appendix 8.18) represents instead a Period 2 Standard Game assuming that
both players, by avoiding the "uncooperative trap" in Period 1, have coordinated on a
bilaterally beneficial equilibrium (Cooperate, Invest). In this case, the payoffs (3, 1.5) are added
to the ones proper to the Period 2 game. Despite the fact that (Not cooperate, Not invest) is still
the equilibrium of this second game, one condition is inherently different with respect to the
game in Period 1. The government and the company have developed a mutual
understanding in Period 1, by credibly coordinating on a combination of strategies that is
more beneficial to them both in the short and in the long run. According to a history-
dependent playing logic, the future rewards and the threat of future punishments have
provided incentives for both players to cooperate today (i.e. Period 1). This concept is
graphically represented in Figure 1 (Appendix 8.18) by the Grim-Trigger Strategy: a player will
cooperate in Period 1 if the other party has never defected before, and it will not cooperate
otherwise. The necessary condition to be satisfied is: Reward - Punishment > Temptation. This
strategy is well represented by the Arot-rov, or Automaton in ancient Greek. As long as
both players adopt a cooperative attitude in Period 1, this self-replicating and positive
feedback-loop will autonomously aliment itself "trapping" the players in this positive
equilibrium for the long term. On the contrary, as soon as one player defects by not
adopting a cooperative attitude, the game is transferred to the right of the Automaton, where
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players are "trapped" in a negative and self-replicating non-cooperative equilibrium. This last
occurrence corresponds to the (Not cooperate, Not invest) combination of strategies.
Figure 2 (Appendix 8.18) represents the choice faced by the Public sector in Period 1. It
could benefit from a greater Defection Payoff for one period by not cooperating, and then
suffer from the much lower Punishment Payoff forever (or until the end of the game);
alternatively, it could benefit from the Cooperation Payoff from Period 1 until the end of the
game (represented as a perpetuity). In order to compare these strategies we introduce the
discount factor 8 = 1/(1+r), where r is the opportunity cost of capital to be adopted for
valuation purposes. In the mathematical representation that follows future payoffs have been
evaluated in the current period by applying the discount factor 8 which is lower than one and
represents the weight assigned to the future by each player. For the sake of clarity, the letter
"p" represents the punishment that the government will suffer in Period 2 if it does not
cooperate in Period 1; in our case, p = 0.
Let 6 = 1 be the present value of $1 received in Period 2 and discounted to Period 1.1+r
In the case at hand, the government will accept to cooperate in Period 1 if and only if:
(a - c) +,6(a - c) + 2(a - c) + . a + p + p + 6 2p +.--
This inequality can also be expressed as:
a-c > p
1-8 1-6
Since in the current game p = 0 (status quo), we find:
a - c
1T-, 8 ! a,
or
C
a
68
Expressing the above-mentioned condition in terms of the interest rate r, we have:
1
a-c P1+r
1+ + ar
1-1+r ~+r
Simplifying the above inequality:
/ 1 p
1+ ir(a -c) a +1+r
Again, since in our case p = 0, we obtain:
a - c
r <_ ac
C
Substituting with the numbers (Matrix 2, Appendix 8.18), we find that the government will
have an incentive to cooperate if and only if:
1
S = 0.254
In terms of r we have:
3
r s - 31
As a reminder, the numerical results obtained are just used for illustrational purposes
and are by no means deemed to be representative of reality. They however allow the reader
to draw conclusions about the strategic development of the game under analysis.
For the sake of clarity, given the condition b - d > brr the company's decision cannot
be represented on a similar graph to the one in Figure 2; the best payoff that this player can
attain is b - d, corresponding to a cooperative attitude vis-a-vis the government; given the
lack of a bigger reward than this one, the private party will always have an incentive to
cooperate if the government does.
The mathematical result shown above confirms that Trigger strategies work if the
future matters enough, and that the uncertainty characterizing the future helps to sustain
cooperation in the present. In order for this cooperative equilibrium to be created and
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sustained threats, rewards and punishments need to be credible. Despite the difficulties and
restrictions characterizing the attainment of this positive equilibrium, it is encouraging to
know that there exist a real possibility for Public and Private counterparties to coordinate on
a long-term cooperative result.
6.4.2 The Augmented PPP game: increasing the odds of a cooperative equilibriun
This second version of the main game introduces the condition of cross-ownership,
implying that the government owns part of the company. This case is specifically inspired by
the example of Botswana, where the country currently holds 50% of Debswana shares. The
assumptions of the first game also apply to this one; we hereby add another assumption:
8. The letter x represents the percentage holding of the country's public sector into the
private party. For the sake of simplicity and according to a zero-sum game logic, we
assume that revenues and expenses, profits and losses, are shared between the
government and the company in line with their respective shares x and (1 - x).
The condition a > b > d > c = brr also underlies the structure of this game.
This Augmented version of the game is represented in Matrix 5 (Appendix 8.18). The
payoffs are exactly the same as the one represented in Matrix 1 with the only difference that
now any private party's payoff is shared with the government on the basis of x. Matrix 6
represents the Augmented game in numeric form under the condition that x = 50% as in the
case of Botswana. Differently from the standard version of the game, this one is not
characterized by a Nash Equilibrium since neither player has a dominant strategy. Knowing
that the public sector will cooperate, the company has the incentive to invest (0.75>0.5),
while subject to the public sector not cooperating, the company will decide not to invest
(0>-0.75). Similarly, the government will cooperate if the company invests (3.75>3.25), and
will not cooperate otherwise (0>-0.5). The Augmented version of the game is thus
characterized by two possible equilibria: the uncooperative one that simply maintains the
status quo, and the cooperative one that fosters a long-term cooperative dynamic identified by
positive payoffs for both parties. The numeric form of the Augmented game is replicated for
Period 2 in Matrices 7 and 8. In the first one, the payoffs displayed are based on the
condition that a (Not cooperate, Not invest) equilibrium was attained in Period 1; the payoffs
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(0, 0) are added to the initial payoffs (equal to the ones characterizing the Augmented Game
in Period 1, given the definition of a repeated game); the matrices in Period I and 2 are
perfectly equal. Matrix 8 builds instead on the assumption that the two players coordinated
on a positive (Cooperate, Invest) equilibrium in Period 1; the payoffs (3.75, 0.75) are therefore
added to the initial payoffs to obtain the matrix corresponding to Period 2. Conversely to the
Standard game, the Period 1 equilibria (Not cooperate, Not invest) and (Cooperate, Invest) are not
self-replicating; players will be subject to the same combination of choices and strategies in
Period 2. In fact, in the second period the game will be repeated and it will still be
characterized by two possible equilibria.
A crucial specification is necessary at this point: despite this game-theoretic analysis
conveys the lack of a univocal solution for the game, if both parties value the potential
upside of long-lasting cooperation, then they should adopt a cooperative attitude starting
from Period 1 and avoid defection afterwards. Accordingly, if the Period I equilibrium is the
negative (Not cooperate, Not invest) both players should credibly commit to cooperate in the
next period so as to converge to a more advantageous equilibrium thereafter; in this second
case, the commitment to be provided after the initial defection will require more complex
and "costly" (for the player committing to cooperate) conditions in order to be credible.
In addition, in this case the government's and the company's payoffs from not
cooperating are lower than in the standard case (3.25<4 for the government, and 0.5<1 for
the company); the values of cooperation are greater than in the standard case only for the
government (3.75>3) since in the augmented version the company's payoffs are shared with
the counterparty. As a result, both parties have a much stronger incentive in this case than in
the standard one to coordinate with each other on a positive (Cooperate, Invest) equilibrium.
Figure 3 presents the "valuation graph" characterizing the government's choice between
gaining a - xd in the first period and 0 forever (or until the end of the game), or alternatively
to secure a - x (b - d) - c from Period 1 until the end of the game. Comparing Figure 1 and
Figure 3, we notice that in the Augmented version of the game the government does not
have any incentive to defect in the first period since the payoff deriving from cooperation is
always the greatest one. This conclusion is extremely powerful since it implies that with
shared ownership there is no need for the players to structure their relationship on the basis
of repeated game in order to sustain their cooperation, which instead originates naturally in
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Period 1. Since the result might have been produced by the specific numbers used in the
example, the game is still solved below according to the condition Reward - Punishment >
Temptation. It is necessary to underline that this influential and telling solution is a fully valid
alternative to the two-equilibria one represented below.
Mathematically, the Government's incentive to cooperate depends on the following
condition:
[a -x(b -d) -c]+8[a -x(b -d)-c] +6 2 [a -x(b -d) -c] + a+ p+8p+& 2 p+.
The inequality above can be also expressed as:
[a -x(b - d) -c] Sp
1-8 1-8
Given the assumption of p = 0 (status quo), we find:
[a - x(b - d) - c]
> a,
or
6 [x(b - d) + c]
a
Expressing the above-mentioned condition in terms of the interest rate r, we have:
1
[a-x(b-d)-cJ p]_p-a
1r >a r1-pp-1 1+r
Simplifying the above inequality:
1+ )[a -x(b -d)- c]>a+( +r r
Again, since in our case p = 0, we obtain:
[a-x(b-d) -c]
C
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Substituting with the numbers (see Matrix 6, Appendix 18), we find that the government will
have an incentive to cooperate if and only if:
(0.5)(1.5) + 16 = 0.4375
4
In terms of r we have:
3.75
r 5 - = 3.75
As already expressed above, the magnitude of the interest rate and delta are probably
too high and not realistic, but their numerical realizations are uniquely dependent on the
specific numbers chosen to portray the example and do not influence the conclusion of this
game theoretic exercise.
The results obtained in this Augmented version of the PPP game are very interesting,
especially if compared to the Standard game's solutions. In the current case, the fact that the
discount factor's lower threshold is greater than the one obtained for the standard game (i.e.
0.4375>0.25), as the fact that the interest rate's upper threshold is greater than the one
presented in the standard game (i.e. 3.75>3), mean that the value attributed by the
government to the future is greater in the current Augmented form of the PPP game. Given
this condition, and the fact that the company will always cooperate if the other player does,
this analysis has succeeded in showing that the attainment of a cooperative equilibrium is
much easier in the case of cross ownership; as mentioned above, this result is even
emphasized by the the conclusion conveyed by the "valuation graph" in Figure 3. From the
public sector's viewpoint, punishment is not an attractive solution anymore, since the
government would pay a share x of any increase in taxes imposed on the company. On the
contrary, in this game it is even more advantageous to develop a long-term understanding
between the players who look at tomorrow on the basis of what is done today. If the
government holds a sufficient share of the company, it will always have the incentive to
cooperate; this incentive increases with the magnitude of cross-ownership.
On a slightly different note, the company's gain in the Standard Game cooperative
outcome was bigger than the one realized in the Augmented Game one (1.5>0.75).
Nonetheless, knowing that the government will have a bigger incentive to cooperate in the
case of cross-ownership (3.75>3), the company is encouraged to sell shares to the
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government in order to avoid the (0, 0) uncooperative trap proper to the Standard Game.
Hence, the conditions proper to the Augmented game can be satisfied much more easily in
order for both players to coordinate on a long-term cooperative equilibrium.
As a final note, despite minor adjustments that might be necessary to address the
specific nature of the relationship between public and private parties, this game is not
country or context specific and its validity extends to the majority of the PPP initiatives.
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7. An open-ended conclusion on the value of PPPs
This comparative study has definitely proved that more differences than similarities
exist between Botswana and Equatorial Guinea. The most salient discrepancy is certainly
related to the record of democracy and institutional quality. It is also likely that all the other
incompatibilities between the two cases follow directly from this first "institutional" one.
Botswana is a positive outlier in the distribution of African countries on several
measures. Already endowed with a pluralistic political foundations and a centralized system
of institutions before independence, Botswana leveraged on its mineral wealth to finance its
economic development and to improve its population's standard of living. It has also
diversified its diamonds-related activities in the downstream part of the value chain so as to
avoid a full dependence on the extractive operations. In particular, the DTC relocation to
Gaborone, expected for the end of 2013, will represent a real game-changer; Botswana will
become the hub for the global diamond trade, sustaining its dominant position even in the
absence of the resource. In line with this premise, the country will likely avoid the realization
of the resource curse; this claim is supported by its unique (on African standards) quality of
institutions, the development of a fruitful and positive relationship with De Beers, and the
continuous inflow of investment from foreigners whose confidence is boosted by the
inclusive nature of the county's system.
The institutional deficit characterizing Equatorial Guinea has both a political and an
economic connotation. Even after controlling for the lower size of natural resource reserves
with respect to Botswana, Equatorial Guinea is still more subject to the realization of the
"natural resource curse"; the expropriatory and extractive nature of the State have attracted a
form of foreign investment which is mostly directed at exploiting the country's oil and
natural gas reserves. The relocation of a DTC-like body to Equatorial Guinea would be very
unlikely because of State's the corrupt and undemocratic nature. This country, differently
from Botswana, has not developed its economy downstream on the "natural resource value
chain", thus avoiding any sort of economic diversification. On the contrary, it has sharply
reduced its involvement in those activities that once made its competitive advantage, like
cocoa and timber production.
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The Repeated PPP game presented in Section 6.4 illustrates the potential cooperative
dynamics that could be created between the private and the public sector. In the Standard
form of the game this coordination on the most beneficial result (i.e. the (Cooperate, Invest)
combination of strategies) has to be fostered by a credible commitment not to defect in the
future and by a strong motivation to sustain a positive and long-lasting relationship. In the
Augmented form of the game, adding cross-ownership to the picture, the attainment of the
cooperative equilibrium is significantly easier, since the government attaches more weight to
future payoffs via the discount-factor mechanism, and the "cooperation payoff" is always
greater in magnitude than the one obtained in the Standard case. The incentive to cooperate
increases with the government's shareholding in the private party. But, if De Beers has
agreed on the 50% government ownership of Debswana, a similar deal is unlikely to be
negotiated in a country lacking any instance of rule of law and democracy". The private
party will constantly suspect the government to be operating according to its own agenda
based on expropriation, theft, and corruption; it will thus be unwilling to concede such a
significant share of ownership to a party whose conduct is more often than not characterized
by the game-theoretic "defection". Hence, how could Equatorial Guinea leverage on the
creation of a PPP in order to increase its chances of escaping the resource curse? In my
opinion, the best solution in this case would be centered on the involvement of a third party
in the game, as an 10 or an NGO that could provide a guarantee for the government
"cooperative behavior"; this arrangement would facilitate the implementation of a PPP and
the attainment of the cooperative equilibrium.
The application of Game Theory to the field of Development Economics offers
elegant and realistic solutions to the lack of cooperative dynamics between the government
and the private sector proper to many developing countries. Thanks to the Game Theory's
models, it is possible to forge implementable strategies to persuade both parties to
coordinate on an equilibrium that is beneficial both for them and for the country as a whole.
Hence, because of its potential applicability to the area of Public Policy, further studies
should focus on this area of knowledge and on the potential impact of the inclusion of IOs
or NGOs as third parties to the game.
48 For this purpose, it is useful to remember that Equatorial Guinea is currently owner of the 28.25% of the
Zafiro Joint Venture established with Mobil Equatorial Guinea Inc.
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As a final note, the potential establishment of a PPP in Equatorial Guinea would not
be limited to an economic and social improvement; by fostering transparency and
participation, as show in the Chad-Cameroon petroleum development project, PPPs could
also create positive externalities on the country's political and institutional system; Equatorial
Guinea should reinvent these best practices and encourage the participation of IOs/NGOs.
In order for a PPP project to express its full potential, Equatoguinean institutions
need to be turned around. In this respect, Public-Private Partnerships offer a strategic and
cooperative loophole for the country to escape this intricate network of corruption and
expropriation and to emerge as a resource-curse free and more democratic country.
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8. Appendix
8.1 Growth Accelerations in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
Soorce: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Deelopment Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Botswana (1966-1978) 1966
GDP (current US$M) 51.47
GDP per capita 336
growth (annual %)
Botswana (1979-1990)
GDP (current US$M)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
1967 1968 1969
58.64 66.25 77.36
2.85 7.26 11.60
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
96.24 126.95 165.25 244.12 306(04 355.17 372.03
13.45 21.82 22.27 17.27 5.05 4.55 6.52
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
819.87 1,060,89 1,073.81 1,014.95 1,172.23 1,240.82 1,114.78
90 7.87 5.19 8.30 9.35 4.98 3.65
1986 1987 1988 1989
1,392.6 1,965.22 2,644.55 3,083.82
4.72 8.38 15.79 9.66
Equatorial Guinea (1993-2003) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
GDP (current US$) 152.13 125.74 16398 259.07 49-. 74 455.8 72.02 t,242.85 1,736.12 2,146.76 2,952.36
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.73 1.61 10.51 24.96 65.6 9 18.13 36)9 8.91 58.27 15.75 1A5
Equatorial Guinea (2003-2011) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP (current US$) 2,952.36 5,240.84 8,217.37 9,602.96 12, 55.15 18,425.04 12,222.20 14,500.47 19789 80
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 10,45 33.84 6.51 1.0 18.01 .61 1 71 3.25 4.84
Notes
1. For both tables, T=time point of the growth take-off; T+8=time point after which, in to qualify as a "growth acceleration" - Hausmann et al. (2005) - growth has to exceed 3.5%.
2. Equatorial Guinea became independent in 1968, but its growth does not accelerate until the oil discovery in 1995; independence is not significant for the purpose of this analysis.
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590.41
9.93
1990
3,79.64
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8.2 Value Added (% of GDP) in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
Agriculture 43.36 33.84 29.88 14.69 6.39 4.85 4.43 2.70 1.82 2.47 2.51
Industry 13.37 19.21 33.64 50.74 61.21 61.02 51.88 52.65 50.16 45.04 45.82
Services 43.26 46.95 36.49 34.57 32.41 34.13 43.69 44.65 48.02 52.49 51.67
Manufacturing 11.59 7.23 5.09 5.44 5.12 4.87 4.54 3.65 3.99 4.20
% of manufacturing value added
Food, beverages and tobacco 44.26 20.26 22.57
Chemicals 4.17
Machinery and transport equipment 6.43
Other manufacturing 36.19 74.66 73.31
Textiles and clothing 8.96 5.09 4.11
Mineral rents (% of GDP) 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.06 2.10 0.33 1.20 0.45 1.25 3.27
Agriculture 68.86 61.55 51.58 9.91 2.61 2.00
Industry 8.68 10.64 27.24 86.74 94.42 95.70
Services 22.46 27.81 21.18 3.35 2.96 2.30
Manufacturing 1.44 6.15 12.61
Source (two tables): The World Bank (2013) World Bank Development Indicators -Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Notes
Since several data are lacking for Equatorial Guinea, not as transparent as Botswana in terms of reporting, only the most relevant data have been displayed in the table.
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8.3 Botswx-ana's positioning in the global market for diamonds (2011)
World Diamond mining production in 2011
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Source: Kimberley Process Rough Diamond Statistics (2013)
World Diamond Production, 2011
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Source: KIMBERLEY PROCESS, 2011. Kimberley Process Statistics, Year 2011. [online] Available
https://kimberleyprocessstatistics.org/static/pdfs/publicstatistics/2011/201 1GlobalSummary.pdf
at:
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8.4 Equatorial Guinea's positioning in the global oil market (2011)
World Oil Supply 2011 ('000 bpd)
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Sotrces: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2013) InterationalEnegy Staistics.
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8.5 Social development indicators in Botswana
Population (1960-2011)
Population, total ('000) 524 596 693 822 996 1,183 1,382 1,586 1,758 1,876 2,007 2,031
Rural population (% of total) 96.94 96.16 92.17 88.12 83.52 73.28 58.07 51.02 46.78 42.68 39.02 38.39
Urban population (% of total) 3.06 3.84 7.83 11.88 16.48 26.72 41.93 48.98 53.22 57.32 60.98 61.61
Health (1960-2011)
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 47.0 46.3 45.8 45.4 44.1 40.1 34.6 30.3 26.9 24.7 23.6 23.3
people)
Fertility rate, total (births per 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.7
woman)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 16.5 14.8 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.5 6.7 8.8 13.4 14.0 13.1 13.3people)
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 111.9 1001 91.9 75.5 58.0 47.1 41.3 45.4 50.5 28.5 21.3 20.3live births)
Children (0-14) living with HIV 1,400 6,800 16,000 19,000 16,000 15,000
Total prevalence of HIV (% of 6.2 19.3 26.8 25.8 23.7 23.4
pop. aged 15-49)
Education (1960,20091)
Primary education, # pupils 83,002 116,293 171,914 223,608 283,516 313,693 324,283 329,191 330,775
School enrollment, primary (% 43.64 56.71 72.67 83.31 85.64 76.89 80.90 84.55 87.07
net)
Secondary education, # pupils2  5,197 14,286 20,969 36,144 61,767 111,134 162,663 171,265 179,830
School enrollment, secondary (% 10.19 14.19 21.83 31.26 40.38 53.40 55.85 61.07
net)
Notes
1. The measured for education enrollment are available up until the year 2009. In correspondence to the year 2010 are displayed the values for the year 2009.
2. The category "Secondary education" includes individuals conducting University studies.
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8.6 Social developmnct indicators in Equatorial Guinea
Population (1960-2011)
Population, total ('000) 252 269 291 238 221 313 374 443 520 608 700 720
Rural population (%/ of total) 74.46 73.50 73.05 72.59 72.13 70.06 65.26 61.17 61.19 61.13 60.66 60.49
Urban population (% of total) 25.54 26.50 26.95 27.41 27.87 29.94 34.75 38.83 38.81 38.88 39.34 39.51
Health (1960-2011)
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 40.2 40.7 39.0 33.9 36.6 45.4 46.9 43.2 39.7 37.8 36.7 36.4
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.2 5.1
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 27.8 26.1 24.5 22.9 21.7 21.0 19.6 17.9 16.8 15.7 14.6 14.4
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 142.0 129.6 118.3 107.6 97.6 89.0 80.8 79.6
Children (0-14) living with HIV 200 500 1,000 1,600 2,500 2,600
Total prevalence of HIV (% of pop. aged 15-49) 0.9 1.5 2.3 3.3 4.4 4.7
Education (1960-2011)
Primary education, # pupils 31,6001 35,9772 61,5323 72,7254 73,307 75,809 85,061 86,821
School enrollment, primary (% net) 72.13 56.28 57.82
Secondary education, # pupils 6,0141 2,729 17,5354 20,705
School enrollment, secondary (% net)
Somrce: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Development Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.woddbank.org/indicator
Notes
1. Data available for Equatorial Guinea are scarce and not released on a yearly basis. Data displayed for the year 1970 correspond instead to the year 1971.
2. Data displayed for the year 1975 correspond instead to the year 1974.
3. Data displayed for the year 1985 correspond instead to the year 1984.
4. Data displayed for the year 1995 correspond instead to the year 1993.
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I8.7 Botswana: Balance of Payments (2008-2017)
(US$ millions) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Current account balance 931.9 -606.0 -296.8 283.9 544.5 503.4 439.5 454.2 426.7 542.2
Trade balance 440.1 -565.8 -237.1 183.1 7.9 -215.8 -263.6 -331.3 -443.4 -685.5
Exports, f.o.b. 4,835.9 3,451.4 4,635.5 6,475.2 6,245.2 6,303.7 6,399.7 6,518.4 6,638.0 6,772.0
Diamonds 3,068.7 2,139.5 3,207.8 4,435.2 4,584.4 4,605.0 4,651.4 4,720.9 4,793.6 4,872.4
Diamonds/Exp. (/o) 63.5 62.0 69.2 68.5 73.4 73.1 72.7 72.4 72.2 71.9
Other raw materials 948.8 582.4 699.1 495.2 743.1 754.0 770.8 784.6 794.3 810.7
Other RM/Exp. ) 19.6 16.9 15.1 7.6 11.9 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
Raw materials 4,017.5 2,721.9 3,906.9 4,930.4 5,327.5 5,359.0 5,422.2 5,505.5 5,587.9 5,683.1
RM/Exp.(%) 83.1 78.9 84.3 76.1 85.3 85.0 84.7 84.5 84.2 83.9
Other 818.5 729.5 728.5 1,544.7 917.7 944.6 977.5 1,0127.9 1,050.1 1,088.9
Imports. fEo.b. -4,395.8 -4,017.3 -4,872.6 -6,292.1 -2. -6,519.4 -6,663.3 -6,849.7 -7,081.4 -7,457.5
Services 80.3 -633.0 -869.7 -881.4 -760.8 -734.7 -727.7 -737.2 -762.3 -942.6
Transportation -382.1 -273.0 -277.9 -289.4 -299.9 -302.2 -311.5 -334.2 -358.3 -459.9
Travel 171.6 317.0 150.5 200.8 230.2 240.6 247.5 253.3 245.3 159.7
Other services 290.7 -677.0 -742.3 -792.9 -691.2 -673.1 -663.7 -656.3 -649.3 -642.4
Income -636.8 -40.7 -206.3 -230.3 -398.7 -366.0 -441.0 -459.7 -460.9 50.2
Current transfers 1,048.3 633.6 1,016.4 1,212.6 1,696.2 1,819.8 1,871.8 1,982.3 2,093.3 2,220.5
SACU receipts 1,146.9 1,159.1 977.7 1,155.8 1,638.7 1,693.5 1,730.9 1,824.9 1,972.2 2,044.2
Capital and financial account 833.3 872.0 165.5 976.5 442.8 363.9 234.8 169.9 148.3 121.9
Capital account 103.7 115.0 22.0 64.8 82.5 92.4 96.0 95.5 92.7 106.4
Financial account 729.6 757.0 143.5 911.7 360.3 271.5 138.8 74.4 55.7 15.4
Direct investment 624.2 601.3 556.1 585.0 546.9 566.0 577.8 591.1 609.1 629.7
Portfolio investment 531.7 -331.7 -402.4 -201.7 -220.5 -260.3 -299.0 -344.5 -397.3 -458.3
Other investment -426.3 487.4 -10.2 528.4 33.9 -34.2 -140.0 -172.1 -156.2 -156.0
Assets -355.6 -581.7 -353.0 -1.7 -110.0 -84.1 -79.9 -82.7 -87.4 -99.6
iabilities -70.6 1,069.1 342.8 530.1 143.9 49.8 -60.0 -89.5 -68.8 -56.4
Net gov. LT borrowing -13.4 936.2 31.9 445.3 73.7 11.8 -68.2 -98.8 -96.5 -92.4
Other net private LT b. -109.5 228.7 66.5 65.4 62.6 40.8 1.5 5.9 25.4 32.2
ST borrowing 52.9 -2.4 -38.1 19.4 7.5 -2.7 6.6 3.5 2.3 3.8
Reserve assets (increase -1,0893 639.3 960.4 -503.1 -987.3 -867.3 -674.2 -624.0 -575.0 -664.1
Net errors and omissions -675.9 -905.3 -829.1 -757.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Balance of payments 8.0 -5.5 -6.4 2.8 5.5 4.6 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.8
Current account 6.9 -5.2 -2.0 1.6 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.3
Trade balance 3.2 -4.9 -1.6 1.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.3 -1.6 -2.0 -2.9
Exports of goods 35.6 29.8 31.1 36.6 34.9 33.5 32.3 31.2 30.2 29.0
Of wich: diamonds 22.6 18.5 21.5 25.1 25.6 24.5 23.5 22.6 21.8 20.8
Inports of goods -32.4 -34.7 -32.7 -35.6 -34.8 -34.7 -33.6 -32.8 -32.2 -31.9
Services balance 0.6 -5.5 -5.8 -5.0 -4.2 -3.9 -3.7 -3.5 -3.5 -4.0
Income and transfers 3.0 5.1 5.4 5.6 7.2 7.7 7.2 7.3 7.4 9.3
Financial account 5.4 6.5 1.0 5.2 2.0 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.1
Direct investment 4.6 5.2 3.7 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7
Portfolio investment 3.9 -2.9 -2.7 -1.1 -1.2 -1.4 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8 -2.0
Other investment -3.1 4.2 -0.1 3.0 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.7
Export volumes -13.4 -28.8 19.8 11.2 7.2 -0.1 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.0
Import volumes 20.6 -3.5 1.4 13.8 -2.5 4.9 3.1 3.4 5.1 7.0
Terms of trade 2.6 5.9 -6.3 -0.2 -2.0 1.4 1.9 1.5 2.5 2.6
End-of-year reserves (US$ mn) 9,115.6 8,668.8 7,883.1 8,386.1 9,373.4 10,240.7 10,914.9 11,539.0 12,114.0 12,778.1
Months of imp. G&S 22.0 17.3 12.6 13 14.9 17.1 18.8 20.4 19.3 19.1
(Months of imports g&s)1 22.0 17.3 12.6 13.0 14.9 17.1 18.8 20.4 19.3 19.1
Souirce IMF, (2012), Botswana. IMF Country Report No. 12/235, p.32. (1) months of prospective imports
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8.8 Equatorial Guinea: Balance of Payments (2006-2010)
(US$ millions) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Current account balance 679 541 1,673 -1,950 -714
Trade balance 6,270 7,886 10,555 3,237 5,936
Exports, fo,b, 8,290 10,251 14,465 8,495 9,781
Hydrocarbons exports 8,217 10,150 14,366 8,386 9,661
Hydrocarbons exports/Exports, f.o.b. (/o) 99.12 99.01 99.32 98.72 98.77
Imports, f.o.b. -2,020 -2,365 -3,909 -5,258 -3,845
Petroleum sector -525 -636 -733 -587 -548
Petroleum products -114 -149 -253 -177 -212
Petroleum/imports, f.o.b. (o) 31.63 33.19 25.22 14.53 19.77
Public sector equipment -1,189 -1,319 -2,486 -3,943 -2,408
Public sector equipment/Imports, f.o.b. (%) 58.86 55.77 63.60 74.99 62.63
Other2  -192 -260 -437 -551 -677
Services (net) -1,117 -1,397 -1,849 -1,750 -1,598
Income (net)3  -4,440 -5,902 -6,953 -3,331 -4,925
Current transfers -34 -46 -81 -106 -127
Capital and financial account 109 -101 -1,263 454 1,608
Capital account 0 0 0 0 0
Financial account 109 -101 -1,263 454 1,608
Direct investment 1,739 1,716 -570 1,304 1,369
Portfolio investment (net) 0 0 0 0 0
Other investment (net) -163 -1,817 -693 -850 239
Medium and long-term transactions -84 -22 -10 502 532
General Government -95 -36 -9 503 533
Of which: Amortization -95 -36 -9 -5 -6
Banks 0 0 0 0 0
Other sectors 11 13 -1 -2 -2
Short-term transactions -1,546 -1,794 -682 -1,351 -293
General Government4 5  -1,203 -1,831 812 -1,437 0
Banks 49 -84 -144 92 -221
Other sectors -392 120 -1,351 -6 -71
Errors and omissions -103 -44 424 29 0
Overall Balance 686 397 834 -1,467 894
Financing -686 -397 -834 1,467 -894
Change in net international reserves6 (increase - -686 -397 -834 1,467 -894
Gross official foreign assets 4,247 6,651 8,012 8,463 9,417
Reserve Assets at the BEAC 3,067 3,846 4,431 3,146 4,100
Reserve Assets at the BEAC/Gross official foreign assets (%/) 72.22 57.83 55.30 37.17 43.54
Of which:- Govemnment Deposits at the BEAC 2,478 3,103 3,973 2,134 2,832
Govemnment Deposits at the BEAC/Reserves (%o) 80.80 80.68 89.66 67.83 69.07
Govemnment deposits outside the BEAC 1,180 2,805 3,581 5,192 5,294
Government deposits outside BEAC/Gross official foreign assets (/) 27.78 42.17 44.70 61.35 56.22
Gross government savings 3,658 5,907 7,554 7,326 8,126
Gross official reserves of BEAC (millions of U.S. dollars) 9,032 12,087 15,688 - -
Gross official reserves of BEAC (months of next year's imports) 4.70 5.00 8.00 - -
Current account balance (percent of GDP; deficit-) 7.10 4.30 9.10 -16.00 -4.60
Overall balance (percent of GDP; deficit -) 7.10 3.20 4.50 -12.00 5.70
Growth of oil exports, including petroleum derivatives (/o) 16.70 23.50 41.50 -41.60 15.20
Growth of non-oil exports, excluding petroleum derivatives (/o) 0.10 37.10 -1.60 9.40 10.70
Growth of other imports (/o) 23.70 35.30 68.30 26.00 22.70
Source: Republic of Equatorial Guinea: 2010 Article IV Consultation, lMF Country Report No. 10/103, p. 20.
Notes: 1. BOP data not compiled in accordance with IMFs Balance ofPayments Manual fifth ediion (ad hoc adjustments applied).
2. Including private sector consumption and investment imports.
3. Including investment income of oil companies.
4. Includes purchase of Devon's share of oil fields in 2008 by Equatorial Guinea.
5. Since 2000, entries represent changes in government deposits in commercial banks abroad.
6. Consists only of items on the balance sheet of the BEAC (i.e. excluding government bank deposits abroad).
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8.9 Analysis of Botswana's role as an exporter
Table 1. Snapshot of the country's exports by economic sector
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 53.26 44.27 46.57 45.35 44.23 51.25 47.01 48.18 42.12 32.46 32.99 39.14
Exports of goods and services (current US$ m) 3,000 2,671 2,837 3,668 4,444 5,256 5,292 5,964 5,662 3,745 4,917 6,782
Goods exports (BoP. current US$ m) 2,675 2,315 2,346 3,024 3,696 4,445 4,522 5,163 4,800 3,435 4,633 0
ICT goods exports (% of goods exports) 0.68 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.36 0.27
Merchandise exports (current US$ m) 2,675 2,510 2,425 2,810 3,513 4,425 4,529 5,174 4,951 3,456 4,693 0
Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports) 0.34 0.45 0.33 0.12 0.28 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.18
Food exports (% of merchandise exports) 2.79 3.14 3.54 2.36 2.49 2.59 2.70 2.83 2.90 5.15 5.08
Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.36
Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports) 6.97 5.48 4.92 10.72 11.22 11.52 16.77 23.28 19.35 16.05 14.54
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 89.56 90.60 90.92 86.39 85.63 85.35 79.95 73.30 76.29 77.97 79.54
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) 0.51 0.25 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.57 0.92 0.40
Service exports (BoP. current US$ m) 325 340 490 643 748 834 779 801 872 496 394 0
Communications, computer, etc. (% of service exports, BoP) 12.31 13.67 21.60 12.72 8.52 15.33 17.73 23.66 23.18 35.29 33.82
Insurance and financial services (% of service exports, BoP) 3.29 3.21 1.89 5.54 6.97 7.08 2.84 3.83 3.84 6.51 1.32
ICT service exports (% of service exports, BoP) 0.12 1.70 2.34 1.51 1.11 2.75 2.24 3.63 3.12 5.55 5.49
Commercial service exports (current US$ m) 306 326 439 626 743 821 771 788 863 486 385 0
Computer, communications and other services (% Comm. Serv.) 6.85 9.91 12.61 10.27 7.85 14.05 16.92 22.42 22.38 33.99 32.15
Insurance and financial services (% of commercial service exports) 3.50 3.35 2.11 5.70 7.02 7.19 2.87 3.89 3.88 6.64 1.35
Sourre: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Development Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
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Graph 1. Botswana's economic concentration on minerals
Botswana's Top 10 exports (2012)
Graph 2. The predominance of diamonds in exports
Botswana's major precious mineral exports in 2012
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Graph 3. United Kingdom as a major trade partner
Major importers of Botswana's diamonds in 2012
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8.10 Analysis of Equatorial Guinea's role as an exporter
Table 1. Summary of the main export statistics
Exports of goods and services (/o of GDP) 99.46 101.35 99.62 96.85 90.13 87.42 86.76 81.89 78.81 69.80 69.90 71.39
Exports of goods and services (current US$ rn) 1,236 1,760 2,139 2,859 4,724 7,183 8,331 10,298 14,520 8,531 10,136 14,129
Merchandise exports (current US$ m) 1,097 1,735 2,117 2,801 4,599 7,064 8,207 10,210 15,900 9,100 9,900 13,500
Soure: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Deelopment Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Notes
Data available for Equatorial Guinea are scarce; as a result the table shows fewer exports' metrics than the ones shown for Botswana.
Graph 1. Exports as a percentage of GDP in "comparable terms"
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP), 2010
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Soure: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Demlopment Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
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Graph 2. The Equatoguinean oil dependence
Equatorial Guinea's top 10 exports (2011)
Graph 3. Crude oil as the main source of exports
Equatorial Guinea's major mineral fuels exports (2011)
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isccxcudxmnicals
Gxxn&caxnpmpewns
Anof itnorwd
Gzrxhcsdshere
* idiais
NVfai ttI
* pm i v x*
\xxl&xbddat
o90%
88%r
Exports Value in 2011 ('000 US$)
Soure (thre graphs): International Trade Center (2013) Trade Map: Trade statistics for
international business development. Available at: http://www.trademap.org
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Graph 4. The major Equatoguinean oil trade partners
Majors importers of Equatoguinean crude oil (2011 &
2012)
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8.11 The role of foreign investment in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
Graph 1. Classification of countries according to their potential to attract investment
Gr eeniar
+
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Thile
Somre: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For beaerforesgn investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
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Table 1. Analysis of the Investment statistics in CEMAC countries
Per
Yr. capita
in US$
Inward
stock
Per
Yr. capita
in US$
Chg.
p.a.
since
2008
Outward
Flow
Outward
Yr. stock
uhg.
Yr. p.a.
since
2008
Numbe Numbe
r of
r parents
Equatorial 737.1 2011 1,023 8,784.7 2011 12,197 20.3% 2.6 2011 0.0% 23 21
Guinea
Cameroon 360.0 2011 18 4,497.1 2011 225 13.0% -74.6 2011 8.5 2009 -94.3% 118 89
CAR 109.2 2011 24 547.5 2011 122 10.4% 43.2 2011 0.0% 7 7
Chad 1,855.0 2011 161 7,249.2 2011 629 42.4% 70.3 2011 0.0% 13 11
Congo 2,102.4 2009 533 18,126.9 2011 4,379 17.7% 58 43
Gabon 33.5 2009 23 2,526.4 2011 1,647 26.9% 87.9 2011 750.4 2011 14.9% 79 58
Source: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforegn investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
Table 2. Analysis of the Investment statistics in a subset of SACU countries
Per Per Chg. Chg. Numbed Per IInward p.a. Outwar Outwar p.a. NumbeCountry Flw Yr. capita stock Yr. capita since d F Yr. d stock Yr. since r r of
in US$ in US$ 2008 2008 parents
Botswana 587.1 2011 289 1,389.1 2009 701 40.7% 3.6 2011 386.2 2011 -10.9% 38 34
Namibia 899.7 2011 387 5,276.1 2010 2,311 22.0% -3.2 2011 29.1 2011 36.7% 54 43
South Africa 5,807.4 2011 115 152,990 2010 3,06 51.2% -634.9 2011 72,284.7 2011 13.1% 1,13 532
Souce: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforin investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
Notes
1. Equatorial Guinea and Botswana are shown respectively in the first line of Table 1 and Table 2, presented in comparison to other
Guinea, and to close competitors and comparable geographies in terms of resource richness for Botswana.
CEMAC countries for Equatorial
2. All latest available data have been displayed for any single country. As a result, the reporting year slightly varies in the two samples in order to maximize the data
availability. Data are unfortunately rarely reported with an annual frequency for developing countries.
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8.12 Sectors with Potential to Attract Investment - Botswana (values in US$ million)
Tariffs
Och"Indosr ad
Agriculture and hunting
Mining and quarrying
Mining and agglomeration of hard coal
Mining and agglomeration of lignite
Extraction and agglomeration of peat
Mining of iron ores
Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except
Quarrying of stone, sand and clav
Mining and quarrving ne.c.
Unsnecified other mining and auarrvinw
Petroleum
Food, beverages and tobacco
Machinery and equipment
Electrical and electronic equipment
Precision instruments
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
Other manufacturing
Recycling
Textiles, clothing and leather
Wood and wood products
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Chemicals and chemical products
Rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic mineral products
Metal and metal products
Unspecified secondary
Electricity, gas and water
Other services
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communications
Finance
Business activities
Mixed goods (trade data)
17.6 0.0%
546.2 12.1% 1 1 3,833.5 0.8%
7.2 0.0%
74.5
0.2
3,751.5
0.0
0.4
117.3
65.0
71.2
3.0
145.0
722.5
23.4
262.6
21.0
4.1
16.0
69.3
24.6
4.5
458.0
0.1%
0.0%
5.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0,0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Imports
154.8
42,
809.8
1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
2.5
805.0
0.7
16.4
606.8
801.8
758.0
73.8
680.3
174.7
2.3
259.5
163.6
35.8
948.3
471.2
191.2
185.6
620.5
14.4 30.7%
0.1
105.7
1.3
2.1
562.6
86.8
-95.8%
1.059.7%
-64.0%
-57.6%
41.1%
27.7%
1
3
16
1
3
2
7
1
3
15
1
3
1
7
0.2 0.0% 229.7 8.4% 1.1%
Source: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforeign investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
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Avg.
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12.3%
10 ( 6O/ln
5.0%
3.9%
4.3%
3.8%
4.1%
4.2%
5.7%
5.4%
4.5%
4.9%
16.7%
6.1%
8.2%
7.8%
8.7%
13.2%
5.4%
13.2%
8.8%
8.8%
5.5%
5.5%
10.4%
10.7%
7.7%
Avg.
appolied
4.6%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.7%
0.0%
0.0%
11.0%
2.2%
3.7%
0.2%
5.1%
9.4%
0.4%
22.2%
5.2%
5.0%
3.2%
1.7%
10.6%
5.5%
3.6%
. ...... ........ .. ........ ...
8.13 Sectors with Potential to Attract Investment - Equatorial Guinea (values in US$ million)
Agriculture and hunting
Forestry and Fishing
Mining and quarrying
Petroleum
Extraction crude petroleum & nat.
Food, beverages and tobacco
Machinery and equipment
Electrical and electronic equipment
Precision instruments
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
Other manufacturing
Recycling
Textiles, clothing and leather
Wood and wood products
Publishing, printing & reprod. of recorded
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel
Chemicals and chemical products
Rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic mineral products
Metal and metal products
1 1
1I
1I
1I
1I
1
1
3.3 0.0%
129.5 0.3%
1.5 0.0%
11,780.5 0.6%
11.780.5 0.6%
0.1 0.0%
11.2 0.0%
0.7 0.0%
1.9 0.00/
437.4 0.00/0
0.0 0.0%
1.5 0.00/
0.1 0.0%
16.1 0.0%
0.0 0.00/
377.1 0.0%
344.2 0.0%
0.3 0.00/0
0.1 0.0%
36.7 0.0% 7.5% 16.4%
T Other services 5 4
Construction 4 4
T Wholesale and retail trade 3 2
Hotels and restaurants 1 1A
R Transport, storage and communications 4 4
Business activities 5 5
Mixed goods (trade data) 0.0 0.0%
Source. International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforeign investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
0.3 7.9% 21.0%
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13.0
4.1
10.0
297.3
437.7
239.0
60.3
259.2
56.1
0.1
30.5
27.1
9.2
183.5
77.6
74.2
92.0
394.6
11.7%
10.2%
4.7%
4.6%
4.6%
16.4%
5.9%
8.0%
7.5%
8.5%
12.9%
5.0%
13.5%
8.6%
8.7%
5.4%
5.3%
10.4%
10.3%
22.6%
21.7%
10.6%
9.8%
9.8%
22.5%
13.0%
17.0%
16.2%
14.6%
28.1%
14.9%
22.5%
18.2%
17.0%
10.2%
10.6%
19.0%
22.3%
.......... .............. . . ........... .
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8.14 Locations Competing for Investment Attraction in the Mining and Oil industries
Table 1. Competitive scenario in the industry of Mining and Quarrying
Country Inward Yr. Inward Yr. A p.a. # # Exports Share in Inports Yr. Avg. Avg.Flow stock since '(8 affiliates parents world faced applied
Canada 17,243.4 2011 13,836.4 2010 23.2% 21,210.5 4.5% 5,579.1 2011 5.2% 0.0%
Australia 9,395.5 2010 148,656.8 2010 32.3% 117,035.9 24.7% 1,192.4 2011 5.2% 0.3%
Russian 280.0 2010 1,157.0 2010 3.5% 125 74 20,413.3 4.3% 1,444.8 2011 4.8% 4.3%
Federation
Congo, 2 2 2,031.3 0.4% 34.4 2011 5.0% 6.4%
Rep.
Botswana 546.2 2009 12.1% 1 1 3,833.5 0.8% 809.8 2011 5.0% 0.2%
Angola 4 4 532.2 0.1% 26.6 2011 5.0% 11.6%
Namibia 1,813.9 2010 22.0% 1 1 1,893.3 0.4% 274.0 2011 5.1% 0.2%
frcua 58,569.4 2010 68.3% 29 13 23,687.1 5.0% 1,362.9 2011 5.1% 0.2%
Zimbabwe 1 1 362.7 0.1% 20.4 2011 4.7% 5.3%
SouMne: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforeign investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
Table 2. Competitive scenario in the industry of Extraction of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas
Country Exports Share in world Imports Yr. Avg. faced Avg. applied
Nigeria 101,775.5 5.6% 52.2 2011 4.9% 5.0%
Angola 63,345.9 3.5% 0.4 2011 4.8% 20.0%
Algeria 54,803.0 3.0% 0.3 2011 4.9% 5.8%
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 16,862.4 0.9% 0.0 2011 4.1% 0.0%
Sudan 12,482.9 0.7% 0.3 2011 3.8% 8.9%
Congo 12,376.5 0.7% 0.1 2011 4.6% 9.8%
Equatorial Guinea 11,780.5 0.6% 2011 4.6% 9.8%
Gabon 7,837.3 0.4% 0.0 2011 4.6% 9.8%
South Africa 158.1 0.0% 14,300.0 2011 4.9% 0.0%
Somure: International Trade Center (2013) Investment Map: For betterforeign investment attraction and targeting. Available at: http://www.investmentmap.org
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8.15 Fiscal Indicators in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea
External debt stocks (current US$m) 553 717 458 454 389 420 440 1.707 1.797 2.396
Debt service on external debt (current US$m) 105 91 69 53 57 48 69 47 75 73
Principal repayments on external debt, public and publicly guaranteed (current US$m) 66 64 52 40 45 37 61 36 56 50
Interest payments on external debt (current US$M) 39 27 17 13 12 11 8 11 20 22
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) 4,3 3,1 2,0 0,9 1,0 0,7 1,1 1,1 1,4 -
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) 19,1 4,9 11,2 4,6 -5,3 -10,8 -6,5 1,7
Source: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Dex/opment Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Botswana
Central Government Revenue 34,8 32,7 26,6 27,6 24,1 23 22
Central Government Expenditure 40,2 43 32,1 27,7 23,6 22,6 21,3
SC-entral Government Balance -5,4 -10,3 -5,4 -0,1 0,5 0,4 0,7
Net Public Debt 8,5 20,7 15,5 17 14,4 14,3 12,7
Equatorial Guinea
Central Government Revenue 37 45,2 29,9 30,5 32,2 34,3 35,4
Central Government Expenditure 21,3 49 35 29,6 30,5 32,5 32,8
Central Government Balance 15,7 -3,8 -5,1 0,9 1,7 1,8 2,6
Net Public Debt 1 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,1 5,3 5
Source: The World Bank (2013) World Bank Deelopment Indicators - Data. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
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8.16 Analysis of the quality of Institutions
Table 1. Corruption Perception Index in a subset of SACU members
1998 2005 2012
Country Country Rank CPI Score Country Rank CP1 Score Country Rank CPI Score
Botswana 23 6,1 32 5,9 30 65
Nanibia 29 5.3 47 4.3 58 48
South Africa 32 5.2 46 4.5 69 43
Source: Transparency International
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2Ol2/results/
(2013) Cormption Perceptions Index 2012. Available at+
Notes
1. The Corruption Perception Index, recorded on a 0-10 scale until 2011, is presented on a 0-100 scale
starting from the year 2012. Botswana's value of 65 can be translated to a 6.5 on the pre-2012 scale.
2. No value has been reported in reference to Equatorial Guinea.
Table 2. Credit Ratings in CEMAC and a subset of SACU countries
S Botswana
A South Africa
C
U49 Namibia
S&P
Local
Currency
Rating
A-
A-
nr
Moody's
Foreign
Currency
Rating
A-
BBB
nr
T&C
A-
nr
A2
Baal
Baa3
Equatorial Guinea nr nr nr nr
Cameroon B B BBB- nr
C
Central African
Reubi nr nr nr nr
C
Chad nr nr nr nr
Gabon BB- BB- BBB- nr
Congo, Republic of nr nr nr nr
Source: Standard & Poor's Rating Services (2013) Sovereigns
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratings-list/en/us
Raing Lit Available at:
Notes
1. Local Currency Rating and Foreign Curreng Rating may differ because an obligor's capacity to repay foreign
currency obligations may be lower than its capacity to repay obligations in its local currency due to the
sovereign government's own relatively lower capacity to repay external versus domestic debt.
2. A Transfer and Convertibity (T&C) assessment is the rating associated with the likelihood of the sovereign
restricting access to foreign exchange needed for debt service
OTe countries displayed in the first section of the table are three out of the five countries composing the
South African Customs Union. They are the only ones represented because they are the most comparable in
terms of development and institutional quality.
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Table 3. Doing Business Statistics
Botswana 59 99 132 90 51 53 49 39 14/ Z9
South Africa 39 53 39 150 79 1 10 32 115 82 84
Nanibia 87 133 56 87 '169 40 82 _ _112 140 _ 41--_ 59
Eq una 1212107 86 103 104 150 173 136 61 _ _185
Cameroon 161 125 95 63 158 104 12i8 __176 157 172 _150
CAR 185 170 147 173 132 104 139 181 182 177 185
Chad 184 181 127 149 140 _104 158 _184 180 _167 _ 185.
Gabon 170 157 110 135 170 104 158 146 135 153 145
149 170 156 104 158 182 181 162 136
Soume: Doing Business (2013) HistoricalData Sets and Trnds Data. [online] Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/custom-query
Table 4. Polity IV Statistics
Botswana 8
Namibia 6
South Africa 9
Cameroon
Central African Reoublic
1
1
8
6
9
-4
-1
4 7
4
4
4
0
9
5 9
7 9
2 6
.3
Chad 1 -2 0 2 6
Congo Brazzaville 0 -4 0 2 3
Equatorial Guinea 0 -0 2 2
Gabon 4 3 4 4 6
Source: INSCR Data Page (2013) Poiy IV. RegimeAuthorib Characteristics and Transitions Datasets. [online] Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm
Notes
1. Eleven-point authority coding on an increasing scale from 0 (i.e. non democratic) to 10 (i.e. democratic).
2. As a second measure of democracy, Poigy is represented on a twenty-one point scale from 10 (i.e. strongly democratic) to -10 (i.e. strongly autocratic).
3. Four-point scale variable: 1 = executive recruitment is closed, 2 = dual executive-designation, 3 = dual executive-election, or 4 = executive recruitment is totally open.
4. Seven-point scale variable taking values from 1 (i.e. executives' unlimited authority) to 7 (i.e. Strongest constraints on Executive authority).
5. Index of political competition ranging from 1 (i.e. absence of competition) to 10 (i.e. perfect political competition).
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Table 5. The Wkorld Bank GINI coefficient in a subset of countries
Botswana 1994 60,96
Namibia 2004 63,90
South Africa 2009 63,14
Equatorial Guinea N/A N/A
Cameroon 2007 38,91
Central African Republic 2008 56,30
Chad 2003 39,78
Congo, Rep. 2005 47,32
~Gabon 2005 41,45
Source The World Bank (2013) GINIIndex. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI
Notes
The GINI index ranges from a value of 0 (perfect income equality) to 100 (perfect income inequality).
Table 6. Global Peace Index in a subset of countries
Botswana 1,786 1,792 1,643 1,641 1,701 1,621 (31 t)
South Africa 2,399 2,412 2,437 2,380 2,362 2,321 (127t)
amibia 2,003 2,042 1,841 1,864 1,843 1,804 (49t)
Equatorial Guinea 2,059 1,964 1,801 1,948 2,028 2,039 (87th)
Cameroon 2,093 2,182 2,073 2,210 2,101 2,113 (97t)
Central African Republic - 2,857 2,733 2,790 2,850 2,872 (151 )
Chad - 3,007 2,880 2,964 2,745 2,671 (145th)
Gabon 1,952 1,878 1,758 1,981 2,067 1,972 (75&)
Congo, Rep. 2,417 2,202 2,192 2,157 2,148 (104tb)
Somce: Vision of Humanity (2013) 2012 Global Peace Index. Available at http://www.visionofhumanity.org/gpi-data/
Notes
Given the GINI data unavailability for Equatorial Guinea, this second table represents the inequality measures as
presented by the organization Vision of Humaniy. The index, ranging from 0 (totally peaceful country) to 5
(extensive lack of peace in the country) allows the reader to establish a comparison not only in geographical, but
also in temporal terms.
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8.17 Dynamics of investment inflows according to the BB-NN model
Graph 1. General representation of the BB-NN model
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8.18 A Game Theory perspective on PPPs
Matrix 1. Standard PPP game (literal form), period 1
In mference to Matrices 1 to 8: the colored numbers in the matrices
corresponding player (i.e. same color).
Private Party
Public
Party
Source: author's analysis
Matrix 2. Standard PPP game (numeric form), period 1
Private Party
Invest Not Invest
Public Cooperate -(3 +5)--
Party Not Cooperate (4,-2) (010)
Source: author's analysis
Matrix 3.
(NC, NI)
Public
Party
Standard PPP game, period 2, if
in period 1
Private Party
Cooperate (3,1.5) (-1, 1)
Not 4,-2) (0,0)
Cooperate '
Source: author's analysis
represent the preferred payoff of the
Notes
For the purpose of this analysis:
a>b>d>c=bsT
*In the matrix, the first payof is related to
the government and the second one to the
company.
**Please refer to paragraph 6.4 for a proper
explanation of the letters' meaning.
Matrix 4. Standard PPP game, period 2, if
(C, I) in period 1
Private Party
Public
Party
Cooperate (6, 3) (2, 2.5)
Noit
No t (7, -0.5) (3,1.5)Cooperate
Soure: author's analysis
100
invest NotInvest
Not
investInvest
Figure 1. The AUTo a.XTov (Automaton) of the Repeated PPP Game
any
Coopera(C, NI), (NC-, 1), (NC, NI)Cooperation _-----Defection
(NC, NI)
Source: author's analysis
Notes
The letters included in the picture above represent the players' strategies:
C = Cooperate
NC = Not Cooperate
I = Invest
NI = Not Invest
Figure 2. The Government's choice in the Standard game framework
a - 4 DEFECTION payoff
COOPERATION payoff
a-c = 3
PUNISHMENT payoff
p 0
t
Source: author's analysis
*Please, to understand the meaning of the letters, make reference to Paragraph 6.4.
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Matrix 5. Augmented PPP game (literal form), period I
Private Party
Invest Not Invest
Cooperate [a+x(b-d)-c, [xbs-r-c, (1-
Public (1-x)(b-d)] x)bsr]
Party Not Cooperate (a-xd, (0,0)
NoI -(1-x)d) IL
Source: author's analysis
Matrix 6. Augmented PPP game (numeric form), period 1
Private Party
Invest Not Invest
. Cooperate (3.75,0.75) (-0.5, 0.5)Pubhic
Party Not Cooperate (3.25, -0.75) (0,0)
Source: author's analysis
Matrix 7. Augmented PPP
if (NC, NI) in period 1
game, period 2,
Private Party
Source: author's analysis
Invest
Matrix 8. Augmented PPP
if (C, I) in period 1
game, period 2,
Private Party
Public
Party
Not
Invest
Coopeate, (-7.5, (3.25,1.5) 1.25)
Not 0) (3.75,
Cooperate (7, 0.75)
Source: author's analysis
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Notes
For the purpose of this analysis:
a>b>d>c=bs-r
*In the marix, thefirstpqyoff is related to the
government and the second one to the company.
**Please refer to paragraph 6.4 for aproper
explanation of the letters' meaning.
Notes
a 4
b =3
bsT= 1
d =1.5
C 1
x = 50% = 0.5
*Pkase consider that these numbers are used as
an example and are not meant to correspond to
reaity.
Public
Party
(3.75, (-0.5,Cooperate 0.75) 0.5)
Not (3.25,- (0,0)
Cooperate 0.75)
Not
Invest Invest
Figure 3. The Government's choice in the Augmented game framework
a-xd = 3.75
a+x(b-d)-
c=3.25
p = 0
COOPERATION payoff
DEFECTION payoff
PUNISHMENT payoff
t
Source author's analysis
*Pkase, to understand the meaning of the letters, make reference to Paragraph 6.4.
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